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The Taxation of Barter Transactions
Robert I. Keller*
INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the tax consequences of two vari-
eties of barter1 transactions. One is the familiar direct barter in
which one taxpayer exchanges goods or services for the goods
or services of a second taxpayer. The second, and of a more re-
cent vintage, is the organized form of indirect bartering accom-
plished through so-called trade exchanges or barter clubs. In
barter clubs, a member who performs services for, or sells
goods to, another member receives trade credits that can be ex-
changed for goods or services of other members.2
Part I of this Article focuses on the tax treatment of direct
barter exchanges. It considers not only exchanges between
previously unrelated individuals, as where a doctor swaps serv-
ices with a plumber, but also those between employers and em-
ployees. While the term barter in common parlance connotes
only the former type of transaction, many transactions between
employers and employees also involve the exchange of noncash
considerations. For example, when an employer compensates
an employee in property, the employer is, in effect, engaging in
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The author is
grateful for the research assistance of Jon J. Robinson.
1. According to the RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 122 (unabr. ed. 1967), to barter means "to trade by exchange of commod-
ities rather than by the use of money." The word barter is derived from the
French barater, to cheat or exchange, and barate, confusion, trouble or deceit.
Id. In a recent IRS survey, 62% of U.S. taxpayers said their consciences would
not bother them if they failed to declare the value of income derived from bar-
ter. Maital, The Tax-Evasion Virus, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 74 (1982).
Estimates of unreported income from barter transactions were omitted
from a recent IRS report on noncompliance "because no reliable data could be
developed." See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ESTIMATES OF INCOME UNRE-
PORTED ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, PuB. No. 1104, at 19 (1979). The
report referred to a study conductd for H & R Block by The Roper Organization
which presented "estimates of barter income ranging from $1.6 billion to $4.1
billion" but noted that "shortcomings in the underlying methodology [made
those] figures suspect." Id.
2. Barter clubs and their members have recently come under the intense
scrutiny of the Internal Revenue Service. See infra notes 209-20 and accompa-
nying text.
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a barter exchange of its property for the employee's services.3
Similarly, if an employer allows an employee the rent free use
of the employer's property, a barter exchange of the rental
value of the employer's property for the employee's services
takes place.4 Finally, even the much discussed interest-free
loan between employer and employee is, in fact, another exam-
ple of a direct barter exchange,5 in which the employee's serv-
ices are exchanged for the use of the employer's money.6 Part I
sets forth five basic tax principles to govern the taxation of di-
rect barter transactions which, if consistently adhered to by the
Internal Revenue Service 7 and the courts, will always produce
proper and rational tax consequences.
Part II explains how trade exchanges or barter clubs oper-
ate and describes the tax consequences of transactions taking
place within such exchanges or clubs. Specifically, it addresses
three questions regarding the taxation of such transactions:
(1) Does a taxpayer receive income on the receipt of a trade
unit, or only when it uses the units to acquire goods or serv-
ices? (2) If a taxpayer must report income on the receipt of a
trade unit, how are the units to be valued? (3) Finally, what
are the tax consequences when a taxpayer exchanges its trade
units for goods or services?
3. See infra text accompanying notes 113-29.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 130-36.
5. See generally Bond, The Use of Interest Free or Low-Interest Loans by
Publicly Held Corporations to Reward Executives, 58 TAXES 542 (1980) (noting
advantages of interest-free loans for corporations and executives; advocating
their consideration in designing executive compensation packages); Joyce &
Del Cotto, Interest Free Loans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAx L. REV. 459
(1980) (distinguishing tax consequences of interest-free term loans from inter-
est-free demand loans); Keller, The Tax Treatment of Interest Free Loans: A
Two Transaction Approach, 1 VA. TAx REV. 241 (1981) (two components of in-
terest-free loans are 1) arm's-length loan from lender to borrower at a fair in-
terest rate followed by 2) a payment by the leader to the borrower which
allows the borrower to pay the interest on the loan) [hereinafter cited as Kel-
ler, Tax Treatment]; Keller, The Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans From
Corporations to Shareholders and From Employers to Employees, 19 B.C.L.
REV. 231 (1978) (arguing for two payment transaction approach in taxing of in-
terest-free loans) [hereinafter cited as Keller, Tax Consequences]. Actually,
when properly analyzed, interest-free term loans between employer and em-
ployee are not really barter exchanges at all. See generally Keller, Tax Treat-
ment, supra, at 250 ("In effect ... when [an employer] makes a noninterest-
bearing term loan to a borrower, two functionally unrelated transactions occur
simultaneously. The [employer-lender] (i) makes the [employee-borrower] an
arm's length loan of the present value of the amount due at maturity and
(ii) simultaneously transfers the additional cash amount, i.e., the excess of the
purported "loan" proceeds over the note's present value, as ... compensa-
tion. . . "). See id. at 253-54, 275-81, 296-97.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 137-66.
7. Hereinafter referred to as "the Service."
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I. DIRECT BARTER TRANSACTIONS
A. THE TWO-PAYMENT APPROACH
All taxpayers who engage in barter transactions are in the
same economic position they would have been had they re-
ceived cash for their goods or services in an amount equal to
the value of the goods or services actually received and used
that cash to purchase goods or services from the other party to
the exchange. Two examples illustrate this basic economic
fact. First, consider a transaction in which an employer com-
pensates an employee for $2,000 worth8 of current business
services with appreciated stock originally costing the employer
$1,000 but having a current fair market value of $2,000. This, in
effect, is a barter exchange of property for services. The
equivalent two-payment cash transaction would be as follows:
Payment 1-Employer pays employee $2,000 for services performed.
Payment 2-Employee pays employer $2,000 cash for the stock.
The tax consequences of the two-payment transaction are obvi-
ous. The employer recognizes a $1,000 capital gain on the sale
of the stock (Payment 2)9 and is entitled to a $2,000 business
deduction for compensation paid (Payment 1).1o The employee
has $2,000 of income (Payment 1)n and takes a $2,000 basis in
the stock (Payment 2).12
A second type of barter exchange might involve a swap of
8. The employee's services will generally be presumed to be equal in
value to that of the stock given up by the employer to acquire those services.
See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
9. Gain from the sale or other disposition of property is defined by
§ 1001(a) to be the excess of the amount realized over the property's adjusted
basis. In the two-payment example in the text, the amount realized is simply
the $2,000 cash received. I.R.C. (26 U.S.C.) § 1001(b) (1976). The employer's ba-
sis in the stock is the $1,000 original cost of the stock to the employer. I.R.C.
§ 1012 (1976). Because stock is generally a capital asset under § 1221, the gain
of $1,000 realized on its sale will be treated as long-term or short-term capital
gain depending on the holding period of the stock. See I.R.C. § 1222 (1976).
10. The Code provides that a taxpayer's deductible business expenses
shall include a "reasonable allowance" for salaries and other compensation.
I.R.C. § 162(a) (1) (1976). Generally, if compensation payments are unreasona-
ble and bear a close relationship to the employee's stockholdings, such pay-
ments will be treated as nondeductible dividend distributions. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1:162-8 (1958). Much more rarely, the Service has been successful in using the
requirement of "reasonableness" in § 162(a) (1) to deny a corporate deduction
for an unreasonably large salary payment to a nonshareholder. See, e.g., Patton
v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948) (deduction of $46,049 for compensa-
tion to firm's bookkeeper unreasonable).
11. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1976).
12. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). Section 1012 provides in relevant part that "[tlhe
basis of property shall be the cost of such property. .. ."
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services between an accountant and a doctor. The doctor per-
forms a physical examination on the accountant, and in ex-
change the accountant prepares the doctor's individual income
tax return. Each would have charged $500 in a cash transaction
for his or her services. The equivalent two-payment cash trans-
action in these circumstances would be as follows:
Payment 1-Doctor pays accountant $500 cash to prepare an individual
income tax return.
Payment 2-Accountant pays doctor $500 cash for a physical
examination.
In this two-payment cash transaction, the doctor has $500 gross
income (Payment 2)13 and a $500 itemized deduction for tax re-
turn preparation (Payment 1).14 The accountant also has $500
gross income (Payment 1)15 and may list $500 as a medical ex-
pense (Payment 2). The medical expense is deductible in full
if the accountant itemizes deductions16 and has other medical
expenses equal to or greater than three percent of adjusted
gross income.17
If, on the other hand, the doctor had performed the $500 of
medical services for a painter who, in exchange, painted the
doctor's personal residence, the doctor would still have $500
gross income (Payment 2), but the doctor could not claim any
offsetting deduction for the painter's personal services (Pay-
ment 1).18 Similarly, if the doctor swapped services for those of
an architect, who drew up plans for the doctor's new home, the
doctor would again have $500 gross income (Payment 2), but
the $500 payment to the architect would simply be included in
the basis of the doctor's new house (Payment 1).19
A rational tax system would treat every barter exchange in
the same manner as its economically equivalent two-payment
13. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1976).
14. I.R.C. § 212(3) (1976). This assumes that the doctor itemizes his deduc-
tions. See I.R.C. § 63(g) (1976 & Supp. 1980). A taxpayer will itemize his deduc-
tions only if they exceed the zero bracket amount. Id. That amount is $3,400 in
the case of a married taxpayer or a surviving spouse, $2,300 in the case of a sin-
gle individual, and $1,700 in the case of a married taxpayer filing separately.
I.R.C. § 63(d) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
15. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1976).
16. See supra note 14.
17. I.R.C. § 213(a)(1) (1976). As a result of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982, a taxpayer may deduct medical expenses only to the
extent they exceed five percent of adjusted gross income, effective for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1982. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 311, - Stat. -, - (1982) [hereinafter cited as TEFRA].
18. I.R.C. § 262 (1976) denies deductions for "personal, living, or family
expenses."
19. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(d) (1958).
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cash transaction. To reach this result in all barter exchanges,
the courts and the Service must consistently adhere to five ba-
sic tax principles. These principles are as follows:
Principle I ("The Taxability of All Noncash Benefits")-All
economic benefits, regardless of form, are includable in income;
the amount of the income is the fair market value of the benefit
received.20
Principle II ("The Presumed-Equivalence-In-Value Princi-
ple")-If the value of the benefit received cannot be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy but the value of the benefit
given up can be, the value of the former is presumed to equal
the value of the latter.21
Principle HI ("The Value Received Theory of Cost")-The
"cost" basis of property received in a taxable barter exchange
is the property's fair market value at the time of receipt.
Principle IV ("The Value Received Theory of Deduc-
tions")-The term "paid or accrued" or "paid or incurred" in-
cludes the fair market value of an in-kind benefit received in a
taxable transaction by the taxpayer.
Principle V ("The No-Wash Principle")-Even if the re-
porting of an item of gross income under Principle I would per-
mit the taxpayer to claim an equal tax deduction under
Principle IV, both the income and the deduction items must be
reported on the taxpayer's income tax return.22
One can see generally how these five principles operate to
provide the tax consequences prescribed by the two-payment
analysis by applying the principles to the two previously de-
scribed examples. In the first example, involving the em-
ployer's transfer of $2,000 worth of appreciated stock to the
employee, the principles applicable to the taxation of the em-
ployee are Principles I and HI, and those applicable to the taxa-
tion of the employer are Principles I, II, IV, and V. The
employee reports the $2,000 value of the stock received as gross
20. See infra notes 28-44 and accompanying text. Certain barter exchanges
of property can qualify for nonrecognition treatment if they meet the require-
ments of I.RLC. § 1031 (1976). Section 1031(a) provides that no gain or loss is
recognized on exchanges of business or investment property (other than stock
in trade, other property held primarily for sale, and stock and securities) solely
for other property "of a like kind" to be held for business use or investment.
See generally 2 B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs
44.2 (1981) (discussing the nonrecognition provision of § 1031(a)). It is as-
sumed throughout this Article that § 1031 will be inapplicable to any described
exchange of property.
21. See infra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
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income under Principle I (the taxability of all noncash bene-
fits) and, under Principle HI, takes a cost basis in the stock re-
ceived equal to the stock's fair market value of $2,000 (the value
received theory of cost). Under Principle I, the employer is re-
quired to treat the value of the employee's services as an
amount realized on the sale of the stock,23 which had a basis of
$1,000. The employee's services, however, will generally not be
independently valued, but rather will be presumed to be equal
to the $2,000 value of the stock given up by the employer to ac-
quire them (Principle H). Thus, the amount realized on the
sale is $2,000, and the realized gain is $1,000. Under Principle IV
(the value received theory of deductions) the employer will be
entitled to a deduction for compensation paid equal to the
$2,000 value of the services realized on the disposition of the
stock. And finally, under Principle V (the no-wash principle),
the employer may not net the $1,000 of realized gain against the
$2,000 in deductions and simply deduct $1,000 for compensation
paid.24
In the accountant-doctor example, in which $500 worth of
services were exchanged, the principles governing the tax
treatment of both taxpayers are Principles I (the taxability of
all noncash benefits), IV (the value received theory of deduc-
tions), and V (the no-wash principle). The doctor reports the
value of the accountant's services as income under Principle I
and also claims their value as a deduction for tax return prepa-
ration under Principle IV. Similarly, the accountant, under
Principles I and IV, has received $500 of gross income and has
paid $500 for medical expenses. Even though the tax return
preparation deduction and the medical expense deduction en-
tirely offset the gross income reported on the transaction by
the doctor and accountant, respectively, both must report the
income and the deduction items on their tax returns, for no
wash is permitted (Principle V).25
In the doctor-accountant example, both parties should gen-
erally be looking to the value of the services they received to
determine their gross income, and not to the value of the serv-
23. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
24. Such a net approach would be unwise, in this example, since the $1,000
of gain would be capital gain, while the $1,000 deduction would be an ordinary
deduction.
25. Even where the itemized deduction is equal in amount to the addition
to gross income, the very inclusion of an item in gross income may have impor-
tant tax consequences. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
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ices they gave up. Principle H is not applicable. 26 For example,
if the doctor's services were actually shown to be worth $600
and the accountant's only $400, the accountant should, under
Principle I, report $600 of gross income and then, under Princi-
ple IV, list $600 for medical expenses paid. The doctor should
report $400 of income (Principle I) and claim a $400 deduction
for income tax return preparation (Principle IV),27
The next section sets forth the rationale for these princi-
ples. A detailed discussion of the current state of the law with
regard to Principles IV and V follows in section C.
B. THE FIVE TAX PRINCIPLES
1. The Taxability of All Noncash Benefits
It is elementary that Congress in writing its broad defini-
tion of gross income in section 61,28 and its predecessor in the
1939 Code, intended to tax all economic benefits without regard
to the form in which such benefits are received.29 The cases 30
and the Regulations 3 1 make it clear that income can be realized
in any form, including services, property, or the rent-free use of
26. The value of the services given up may be considered, at best, some ev-
idence of the value of the services received. See infra notes 50-61 and accompa-
nying text.
27. See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
28. "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all
income from whatever source derived. . . ." I.R.C. § 61 (1976).
29. See, e.g., General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434
(1955) (taxing insider profits as gross income in "accordance with the legisla-
tive design to reach all gain constitutionally taxable unless specifically ex-
cluded"); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (punitive
damages award taxable as gross income as "Congress applied no limitations as
to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature");
Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945) (predecessor of § 61 'Is broad
enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit con-
ferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form").
30. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) (employee re-
ceiving stock options as compensation taxed on the difference between the op-
tion price and the market value of the stock when acquired); Helvering v.
Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 467-68 (1939) (lessor taxed on increase in value of leased
property attributable to additions erected by lessee); Frueauff v. Commis-
sioner, 30 B.T.A. 449, 450 (1934) (shareholder taxed on fair rental value of corpo-
rate-owned apartment which he occupied rent free). See also STAFF OF JOINT
COMeM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAxAION, 93RD CONG., 2D SESS., EXAMINATION OF
PRESIDENT NIxoN's TAX RETuRNs-FOR 1969 THROUGH 1972 at 158-61 (Comm.
Print 1974) (free use of government transportation on personal business consti-
tutes "income").
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1960) states that "gross income includes income
realized in any form, whether in money, property, or services. Income may be
realized, therefore, in the form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or
other property, as well as in cash."
1982]
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property. The Service recently reaffirmed this principle in Rev-
enue Ruling 79-24,32 involving a barter exchange of services for
services and an exchange of the rent-free use of property for
property. In the first situation, a housepainter painted a law-
yer's personal residence in return for legal services. The Serv-
ice ruled that "[t] he fair market value of the services received
by the lawyer and the housepainter are includible in their gross
incomes under section 61 of the Code. '33 In the second situa-
tion, an apartment building owner received a work of art from a
professional artist in return for the artist's rent-free use of an
apartment for six months. The Service ruled that the artist had
to include the fair market value of the apartment in gross in-
come and that the owner had to include the fair market value
of the work of art in gross income.3 4
Not only is the form of the benefit received irrelevant
where someone receives noncash consideration for services or
rent, but it is also irrelevant where the in-kind benefit is re-
ceived in whole or part payment of the purchase price of prop-
erty. In the sale situation, section 1001(a) defines gain as the
excess of the amount realized over the taxpayer's adjusted ba-
sis and defines loss as the excess of such basis over the amount
realized. Section 1001(b) then defines amount realized as the
"sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received." While this language in
section 1001 (b) could be read literally to exclude such noncash
considerations as services or the rent-free use of property in
determining the amount realized, the law has long been settled
that the word "property" in section 1001(b) includes all valua-
ble noncash considerations. 35
32. 1979-1 C.B. 60.
33. Id. at 61. Since the services performed by the lawyer and painter were
said to be of a personal nature, and therefore nondeductible, even if actually
paid in cash by the two parties, it was not necessary for the Service to make
any comment about the validity of the value received theory of deductions. See
infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
34. 1979-1 CB. at 61. Although the Service was silent on the point, it seems
clear that the landlord would take a basis in the painting equal to its fair mar-
ket value at the time of receipt. See infra text accompanying notes 66-78. The
ruling does not state whether the artist used the apartment in whole or in part
as his professional studio, and the I.R.S. does not discuss the possibility that
the artist would, in such circumstances, be entitled to claim all or part of the
rental value taken into income as a business deduction. See infra notes 79-88
and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310,
313 (2d Cir. 1943) (services rendered by employees who received shares of
stock as bonuses from the taxpayer held to be "property received" in predeces-
sor to § 1001(b)). See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
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The only type of economic benefit that most courts have
yet to include as an item of gross income is that derived from
the receipt of an interest-free or low-interest loan.3 6 The inter-
est-free loan cases will be considered later. For now it is suffi-
cient to note that those cases are unique among barter
transactions and should not cast any doubt on the scope of sec-
tion 61 insofar as in-kind transactions not involving interest-
free loans are concerned.37
a. Bargain Purchase as Income
In the barter transactions in Revenue Ruling 79-24,38 the
Service assumed that the recipient of the property or services
paid no cash for the economic benefit received. It is, of course,
possible that a recipient could pay some cash for the property
or services, but in an amount less than the fair market value of
the property or services received. For example, assume that
the housepainter in Revenue Ruling 79-24 not only painted the
lawyer's residence but also paid the lawyer $2,000 cash in ex-
change for the lawyer's personal services. If we assume the
lawyer's services had a value of $5,000, the housepainter should
recognize $3,000 compensation income, representing "the differ-
ence between the amount paid for the [lawyer's services] and
the amount of [their] fair market value at the time of the trans-
fer."39 The lawyer, of course, has received $5,000 of income,
computed by adding the $3,000 value of the housepainter's serv-
ices to the $2,000 cash received.
b. Fair Market Value
In barter exchanges, the Regulations require the recipient
of a noncash benefit to include the benefit in income at its "fair
market value,"40 defined as "the price at which the property
36. See, e.g., Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Dean v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), nonacq. 1973-2 C.B. 4; authorities cited supra
note 5.
37. See infra notes 137-66 and accompanying text.
38. 1979-1 C.B. 60.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2), TMD. 7554, 1978-2 C.B. 71, 73.
40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (1), T.D. 7554, 1978-2 C.B. 71, 73. That section
provides that if payment is made for services in a form other than money, the
fair market value of the property or services taken in payment must be in-
cluded in income. It further states that "[i]f the services are rendered at a stip-
ulated price, such price will be presumed to be the fair market value of the
compensation received in the absence of evidence to the contrary." See in fra
notes 62-65 and accompanying text. Similarly, I.RC. § 1001(b) (1976) provides
that "[t]he amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be ... the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
19821
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would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."41 The fair
market value of an item is generally an objective determina-
tion, with "individual preferences, real or feigned ... treated
as irrelevant."42 Nevertheless, this does not mean that, in bar-
ter transactions, fair market value must always be the same re-
gardless of the identity of the recipient of the noncash benefit.
For example, a retailer who would be in a position to purchase
goods at wholesale from a dealer in a cash transaction should
certainly not have to recognize the retail value of those goods if
the retailer receives them in a barter exchange with a dealer of
such goods.43
When the property being valued is the type sold in the re-
tail market, there can be a variety of prices at which the prop-
erty would change hands between a willing buyer and seller. A
manufacturer might sell its product to a wholesaler for $5, who
would then sell it to a retailer for $10; finally, the retailer might
Moreover, it is provided in § 83 that if, in connection with the performance of
services, an employee or independent contractor receives property not subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture, he must report in his gross income the excess
of the property's "fair market value" over the amount, if any, he paid for the
property. The fair market value is "determined without regard to any restric-
tion other than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse." I.R.C.
§ 83(a) (1) (1976). See also Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60.
41. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368. See Staley v.
Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 752, 769 (1940); Newberry v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A.
1123, 1129 (1939).
42. M. CHIRELSTEiN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 1.02, at 18 (3d ed. 1982).
But see Reginald Turner, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 464, 465 (1954) (steamship tickets
won as prize valued at less than retail value, since they constituted "a luxury
otherwise beyond their means").
43. The Regulations recognize the wholesaler-retailer distinction in the
analogous situation involving, the valuation of charitable contributions. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (c) (2) (1972). The general rule of § 170 is that a taxpayer
donating property to charity is entitled (subject to the reductions set forth in
I.R.C. § 170(e) (1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4) to a deduction equal to the fair
market value of that property, Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (c) (1972), and that the fair
market value is the price an ultimate user would pay the donor for the contrib-
uted property. Goldman v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 476, 478 (6th Cir. 1967). Nev-
ertheless, the Regulations specifically provide that,
[i]f the contribution is made in property of a type which the taxpayer
sells in the course of his business, the fair market value is the price
which the taxpayer would have received if he had sold the contributed
property in the usual market in which he customarily sells, at the time
and place of the contribution and, in the case of a contribution of goods
in quantity, in the quantity contributed. The usual market of a manu-
facturer or other producer consists of the wholesalers or other distribu-
tors to or through whom he customarily sells, but if he sells only at
retail the usual market consists of his retail customers.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c) (2) (1972).
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sell it to the ultimate consumer for $15. Each of these sales is
an arm's-length transaction between willing buyers and sellers,
but each is at a different price. Moreover, even sales from a
wholesaler to a retailer, or a retailer to a consumer, may be
made at different prices to different buyers. Certain preferred
customers may be granted special low prices, different retail es-
tablishments may sell to the public at different discounts, and
purchasers of large quantities of goods and services may re-
ceive special discounts. Given this variety of potential selling
prices of the same goods, the proper rule of valuation in barter
exchanges would be that goods and services received in a bar-
ter exchange from a seller should be valued at the cash price
the recipient would have been required to pay had he or she
purchased the same quantity of goods and services from this
seller for cash.44 Only that amount represents the economic
benefit received by the taxpayer.
2. The Presumed-Equivalence-In- Value Principle
a. The Relevance of the Value of the Economic Benefit
Given Up
In any exchange in which a taxpayer receives a noncash
benefit, he or she is taxable on the value of the benefit received
(Principle I), and not on the value of what he or she gave up.
Nevertheless, at times, evidence of the value of what was given
up may be relevant, or even conclusive, in determining the
value of what was received. This is because proof of what one
arm's length buyer would pay to acquire property is evidence
of the value of the property.45 For example, when Individual A
exchanges land worth $100,000 for B's closely held stock,
$100,000 represents the amount that A, an arm's length pur-
44. See supra note 43.
45. See supra note 41. The courts have often used the so-called "compara-
ble sales" method to value property. See, e.g., Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1, 19 (1979); Estate of Fawcett v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.
889, 899 (1975); Estate of Nail v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 187, 193 (1973).
The "comparable sales" method functions by: (1) Locating [proper-
ties] as physically similar (comparable) as possible to the subject
[property] which (2) have been sold on the open market in noncollu-
sive, nonforced sales for cash or cash equivalent, within (3) a reason-
able time of the date for which a value of the subject property is
desired.... Like most valuation techniques, the comparable sales
method is far from an exact science. However, it is based upon the
commonsense approach of taking the actual sales prices of properties
similar to the subject property and then relating these prices to the
subject property.
Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 19.
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chaser, was willing to pay to acquire the stock. The value of
the land given up, therefore, is evidence of the value of the
stock received.
The evidentiary weight attributable to the value of the ben-
efit given up should vary with the circumstances of each case.
Sometimes it will have virtually no probative value;46 other
times it will constitute important evidence to be weighed along
with all other relevant evidence bearing on the value of the
benefit received 47 and still other times, when it is virtually the
only significant evidentiary factor bearing on the value of the
benefit received, it will be conclusive of that value.48 Only in
the last circumstance is the oft-quoted statement that "the
value of the two properties exchanged in an arm's length trans-
action are either equal in fact, or are presumed to be equal,"49
appropriate.
b. The Irrebuttable Presumption of Equality of the Two Sides
of an Arm's Length Exchange: When Should It Be
Used?
The leading case supporting the presumed-equivalence-in-
value principle is the 1963 Supreme Court decision in United
States v. D.avis,50 which involved the transfer of 1,000 shares of
appreciated marketable stock by a husband to a wife as part of
a divorce settlement. The Supreme Court viewed the transac-
tion as a taxable exchange in which the husband transferred
his stock in exchange for his wife's relinquishment of her mari-
tal rights. Thus, technically, the amount realized by the hus-
band was the wife's marital rights. The Court, however, did not
independently value the wife's marital rights, but simply as-
sumed them to be equal in value to the marketable stock the
husband gave in exchange. In holding that the "amount real-
ized" by the husband on the exchange of his stock was equal to
the value of such stock, the Court said:
It must be assumed, we think, that the parties acted at arm's length
and that they judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the prop-
erty for which they were exchanged. There was no evidence to the
46. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
49. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962); Philadelphia Park Amuse-
ment Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954). Experience tells
us that a presumption of equality is simply not appropriate in many barter
transactions. Often one side outbargains the other and in no sense can it be
said that the two sides of the exchange are equal.
50. 370 U.S. 5 (1962).
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contrary here. Absent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted prac-
tice where property is exchanged to hold.., that the values "of the
two properties exchanged in an arms-length are either equal in fact, or
are presumed to be equal."5 1
Similarly, if an employer pays a bonus to an employee or
makes a contribution to a qualified trust for its employees in
the form of appreciated property, the amount realized on the
disposition of the employer's property is technically the intan-
gible value of the employee's or employees' services, past or fu-
ture, which the employer receives in exchange for the property.
Again, however, because of the difficulty in valuing the services
received, they are presumed to be equal to the value of the
property given in exchange. 52 The employer's gain on the
transfer, therefore, is the excess of the transferred property's
value over its adjusted basis.53 In the case of Tasty Baking Co.
v. United States, 54 for example, the Court of Claims applied the
Davis presumed-equivalence-in-value rule where the employer
transferred a building, in which its executive offices and manu-
facturing facilities were housed, to a pension trust for the em-
ployees. The court held that the employer realized gain on the
transfer of the property equal to the excess of the building's
value over its adjusted basis, stating that,
[i]t is clear ... that the [Davis] technique of presuming an intangible
and unappraisable contribution as an equal exchange for property
transferred is to be applied to a variety of situations broad enough at
least to include a taxpayer who desires the separation of a wife; and
one who wishes the continued adhesion of an employee.55
The presumption of equal value in cases like Davis and
Tasty Baking is really an irrebuttable one, since in such cases
either no other evidence of the value of the benefit received is
available, or, if such other evidence is available, it is insignifi-
cant when weighed against the "best" evidence of what a buyer
in an arm's length transaction-i.e., the buyer in the very trans-
action under examination-paid for the benefit.56 As more in-
51. Id. at 72 (quoting Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States,
126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954)).
52. E.g., International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310, 313
(2d Cir. 1943). Cf., United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12-13 (6th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961) (transfer of appreciated property to
an employees' trust); Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992, 995 (Ct.
Cl. 1968) (same).
53. See cases cited supra note 52.
54. 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
55. Id. at 995.
56. In Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl.
1969), for example, the Court of Claims stated that where one side of a barter
transaction has no readily ascertainable market value but the other side does,
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
dependent evidence of the market value of the benefit received
becomes available, however, and the clarity of the value of
what was given up lessens, the irrebuttable, presumption of Da-
vis and Tasty Baking is less appropriate, and the value of what
was given up is, at best, only one piece of evidence of the value
of the benefit received.
c. The Value of the Benefit Given Up as Probative But Not
Conclusive Evidence of the Value of the Benefit
Received
Reliance on the value of the property given up as the sole
and conclusive evidence of the value of the property received
should clearly be limited to cases where the value of the prop-
erty received cannot be reasonably ascertained in other ways.
This does not mean, however, that in all other cases the value
of the benefit given up is irrelevant in the valuation process.
Sometimes it will be probative, though not conclusive, evidence
of the value of the benefit received.57
Consider, for example, a barter exchange of land for a
painting, where the land has a reasonably determinable value
but the painting is by an artist who has sold few other works in
the marketplace. The landowner's gain is, of course, the excess
of the value of the painting received over the adjusted basis of
the land given up. But in determining the painting's value,
proof of the value of the land given up is surely a relevant fac-
tor. While independent appraisals of the painting received in
this barter transaction would be appropriate, as would evidence
the value of the side with the readily ascertainable value "constitutes the best
evidence of the fair market value of the [other side]." Id. at 1252.
57. For example, in Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.
1970), the Fifth Circuit concluded that the value of property given up should be
considered evidence of the value of property received, but that on the facts of
the case, "[i]t would ... be inappropriate to give the presumed-equivalence-in-
value rule the full presumptive effect given in Davi, et al." Id. at 1001. In Bar
L Ranch a taxpayer, who was insolvent, transferred some land in exchange for
notes and accounts receivable with a face value of $118,000. The taxpayer, in
determining the amount realized on the disposition of the land, valued the
notes received at $50,000, the value of the land transferred. The district court
concluded that evidence of the value of the land was irrelevant. 300 F. Supp.
839, 841 (S.D. Tex. 1969). It stated that "[o]nly two amounts-the land's ad-
justed basis ... and the value of the note and accounts--are material" Id.
The trial court noted further that "an expert witness offering a reliable ap-
praisal of the note and accounts would have been more helpful." Id. at 842.
The Fifth Circuit, in reversing and remanding the lower court's decision, agreed
as to the relevance of a reliable appraisal but thought that "evidence of the
value of the land is relevant in determining the fair market value bf the note
and accounts received. .. " 426 F.2d at 1000.
[Vol. 67:441
BARTER TRANSACTIONS
of the price at which previous works of the same artist sold, the
evidence of the amount paid by the landowner-the value of
the land given up-is also probative of the painting's value.58
The value of the land represents what one arm's length buyer
was willing to pay for this artist's work. Since there have been
few other market transactions in the artist's work in the past,
the evidence of the amount actually paid in this market trans-
action for this unique work of art seems quite significant. Of
course, proof that the landowner was not at all knowledgeable
about the value of art would significantly detract from the
weight of this evidence in determining the painting's value, as
would evidence that the landowner was not knowledgeable
about the value of the land given up.59
d. Circumstances in which the Value of the Benefit Given Up
Is Virtually Irrelevant
If, in the above example, the painting had been acquired
not for land, which was easier to value than the painting, but
for another painting by an equally obscure artist, the value of
the property given up would have little, if any, probative value
in determining the value of the painting received. Where evi-
dence of the value of the property given up is no more reliable
than that of the value of the property received, using the for-
mer to value the latter would be a circular bootstrap operation,
inevitably involving the use of the value of each painting to de-
termine the value of the other.60
Similarly, where the value of the in-kind benefit received is
readily determinable by numerous other market transactions,
58. See Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1970), discussed
supra note 57.
59. In Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 1256 (Ct.
Cl. 1969), for example, the Court of Claims, in applying its presumed-equiva-
lence-in-value rule, found it important that the taxpayer had been fully in-
formed and was knowledgeable about the value of the property being received.
60. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made it clear in Seas
Shipping Co. v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 528 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943
(1967), that the equating of two sides of a barter as a method of valuation
should be used only under certain limited circumstances. Id. at 532. It noted
the obvious dangers in evaluating the consideration involved on one side of a
barter by determining the worth of the consideration on the other side:
In the first place, the two sides of the barter may, for various reasons,
not be equal in value. Secondly, the barter equation method is in the
nature of a bootstrap operation since there is usually no logical reason
to start with one side rather than the other. . . . Thirdly, the evidence
on the value of one side of a barter may be no more reliable than that
on the value of the other side.
Id. at 529-30.
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evidence of the value of the benefit given up, even if relatively
easy to ascertain, has little, if any, probative value.61 Assume,
for example, that a doctor performs a standard physical exami-
nation for which the doctor customarily charges $500 to cash
patients. One time, however, the doctor agrees to perform the
same physical examination for an accountant in exchange for
which the accountant is to prepare the doctor's tax return. The
accountant should, of course, report the $500 value of the doc-
tor's services as income. That the accountant could show con-
clusively that his or her usual charge for preparing a similar
return would have been only $400 is virtually immaterial to de-
termining the value of the doctor's services received. Since
there presumably exist numerous other market transactions in
which patients paid $500 for the same medical services per-
formed by this doctor, additional evidence of what this one pur-
chaser was willing to pay seems entirely insignificant.
e. The Effect of the Parties' Stipulating a Cash Price for the
Property or Service Exchanged
At times, a taxpayer may initially contract to sell his or her
property or perform services at a stipulated cash price but may
subsequently agree to accept an in-kind consideration in lieu of
the stipulated cash price. In such cases the Regulations state
that the stipulated cash price "will be presumed to be the fair
market value of the compensation received in the absence of
evidence to the contrary."62 For example, assume Individual A,
a cash basis taxpayer in an arm's length transaction, agrees to
perform services for Individual B for $20,000. When payment is
due, however, A accepts 10 shares of closely held stock owned
by B in lieu of the $20,000 stipulated. In general, under the Reg-
ulations, no independent inquiry need be made into the value
of B's closely held stock. Rather, the Regulations presume it to
be worth $20,000 (the stipulated cash price). A should there-
fore report $20,000 of income and take a $20,000 cost basis in the
acquired property.
The presumption that the property received is equal to the
stipulated cash price is appropriate in the above example, since
the described transaction, when properly viewed, is not a bar-
61. There is no precedent authorizing the use of a barter-equation method
where there is an active market for the property to be valued. Id. at 532.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1), T.D. 7544, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,913 (1978). Some
examples of evidence to the contrary might be where the stipulated price is ob-
viously a sham or where the stipulated price had been the subject of
renegotiation.
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ter exchange at all. Rather, it is two cash transactions. If a tax-
payer accepts property in satisfaction of a cash debt, it is well
settled that such transaction "is to be treated no differently
than as if the debtor issued his check to the creditor in pay-
ment of the debt and then received the creditor's check in pay-
ment for the property."63 Thus, A should be viewed as having
received $20,000 in cash compensation and then as having used
the $20,000 cash to purchase B's stock. Whether A got a good
deal or a bad deal by purchasing B's stock for $20,000, or
whether B's stock is worth more or less than $20,000, is of no
immediate tax concern, since taxpayers do not realize gain or
loss when in an arm's length transaction they pay cash for
goods or services.64 They are simply assumed to have received
what they paid for.
The stipulated price concept explains what would appar-
ently be the tax consequences in a barter exchange if the prop-
erty received could be independently valued, but the property
given up was of such highly marketable quality that one could
say that the parties were dealing with one another with a stipu-
lated cash price in mind and then discharging that cash price
with property. For example, assume that Individual A acquires
a painting from Individual B and in exchange gives Individual
B stock which had a basis to A of $50,000 and was selling on the
New York Stock Exchange for $100,000. Individual A should re-
port a $50,000 gain on the transfer of the stock (the excess of
the value of the marketable stock given up over its basis), with-
out regard to any independent proof as to the value of the
painting received. As in the prior example, this transaction
should properly be viewed as one in which A agreed to
purchase B's painting for a $100,000 stipulated cash price and
then satisfied the obligation thus created by transferring the
marketable stock. In such a transaction, the amount realized is
the $100,000 obligation cancelled.65 Whether A received a paint-
ing worth more or less than $100,000 will be taken into account
at the time A disposes of the painting. It is only in true barter
transactions, in which the value of the benefit received is the
measure of the amount realized on the disposition of the prop-
erty given up, that good or bad deals are reflected at the time of
the initial barter exchange.
63. Schultz v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 559, 565 (1973). See generally 2 B.
BrrrxER, supra note 20, 1 40.4.1 (property transferred in satisfaction of a debt).
64. 1 B. BrrICER, supra note 20, 5.8.4 (gain); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b), T.D.
6735, 29 Fed. Reg. 6,493 (1964) (loss).
65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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3. The Value Received Theory of Cost
Whenever a taxpayer receives property in a taxable ex-
change, he or she is in the same economic position as the tax-
payer who receives additional cash income which the taxpayer
then uses to purchase equivalent property. In a rational tax
system, the .two taxpayers must be treated alike. That is, the
property recipient must not only be required to report income
equal to the value of the property received (Principle I), but he
or she must also be given a cost basis in the property equal to
its value. If a taxpayer were not given a fair market value basis
in property includable in the taxpayer's gross income, the tax-
payer would be subject to a double tax on the property-once
on the value of the property when received and a second time
on the amount realized upon its disposition.
For this reason the courts have long held that, for purposes
of section 1012, the "cost" of property that is taxable upon re-
ceipt is the fair market value of such property.6 6 The literal
value, if any, of the quid pro quo given in exchange for the"
property does not justify the rule, for it applies regardless of
the actual value of the property transferred in the exchange.
Rather, the justification for the rule is the need to reach ra-
tional tax results.67 This nonliteral-value-received interpreta-
tion of "cost" applies equally to found property or property won
as a prize, where there is literally no cost to the taxpayer, 68 as
to property received in a taxable exchange for other property,
where it can be said that the taxpayer has a literal cost equal to
the fair market value of the property given in exchange. 69
Professor Ernest Brown, in his seminal article, The Grow-
ing 'Common Law' of Taxation,7 O hypothesized the case of a
taxpayer who received an automobile valued at $5,000 as a bo-
nus from his employer or as a prize in a lottery.7 ' The taxpayer
66. See, e.g., Smith v. Russell, 76 F.2d 91, 93 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 614 (1936); Knight v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 188, 190 (1933); Heninger v.
Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1318, 1320 (1928); B. BrTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL IN-
COME ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 464 (4th ed. 1972); 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P.
MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 838 (1972); Brown, The Grow-
ing 'Common Law' of Taxation, 1961 So. CAL. TAX INST. 1, 7-8; Greenbaum, The
Basis of Property Shall Be the Cost of Such Property; How is Cost Defined? 3
TAX L. REV. 351, 360-61 (1948); Wurzel, The Tax Basis for Assorted Bargain
Purchase or: The Inordinate Cost of "Ersatz" Legislation, 20 TAX L. REV. 165,
175 (1964-65).
67. See Brown, supra note 66, at 7-8.
68. Id.
69. See infra note 73. See also infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
70. 1961 So. CAL. TAX INST. 1.
71. Id. at 7-8.
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reported the automobile's value as income, but soon decided to
sell it for cash.
Its value, let us say $5,000, is clearly income to him when received. He
reports it as such and pays the appropriate tax. But he decides that
such a car is beyond his needs and style and sells it for cash. What is
the tax result? What is his basis? Search the statute as we will, all we
can find is "cost". And what is cost? Literally, in the case of the bonus
it is zero. Literally, in the case of the lottery prize, it is the price of the
ticket. But we should all be startled if our taxpayer were required to
pay a tax on the value of the car when he received it and another tax
on all, or almost all, of the proceeds of sale. So we should, I am sure,
stretch the word "cost" almost out of recognizable shape to make it
mean the amount at which the car was taken into income, and we
should feel justified in doing so in order to give the statute the quality
of rationality.
72
When Professor Brown speaks of giving "the statute the quality
of rationality," he obviously means that it would be an irra-
tional tax statute that taxed a person who received a $5,000 car
in a lottery or as compensation differently from a similarly situ-
ated taxpayer who received $5,000 cash and used it to purchase
the car.73
The leading judicial exposition of the value received theory
of cost is the Court of Claim's 1954 decision in Philadelphia
Park Amusement Co. v. United States.74 In that case, a tax-
payer conveyed a bridge to the City of Philadelphia in ex-
change for a ten-year extension of its franchise to operate a
passenger railway in the park. The issue was the cost basis of
the depreciable franchise extension to the amusement com-
pany under the predecessor of section 1012. The court held
that, in a taxable exchange of properties, it is the value of the
property received in the exchange, and not the value of the
property given up, that determines the property's basis in the
72. Id. Professor Brown goes on to note that "[pirior to 1954, we would
have been faced with the same problem [of reading the word "cost" in a nonlit-
eral fashion] had our taxpayer sold property received as a dividend in kind, but
Section 301(d) (1) has now filled that gap.. . ." Id.
73. The same sort of double taxation recognized by Professor Brown in his
hypothetical involving the receipt of a car as a bonus can occur in a barter ex-
change of properties. Suppose that taxpayer A exchanges property with a fair
market value of $1,000 and a basis of $900 for property of taxpayer B which has
a fair market value of $2,000 and a basis of $1,000 ($2,000 amount realized-900
basis). If A's basis in the property received were the $1,000 value of the prop-
erty given up, instead of the $2,000 value of the property received, and A de-
cided to sell the property received from B for $2,000, A would be required to
recognize another $1,000 in income. Thus, A would recognize a total of $2,100 on
the two transactions, in which A's economic gain was only $1,100. See infra
text accompanying note 76.
74. 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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hands of the recipient.75 Therefore, the basis of the franchise
to the taxpayer was its fair market value on the date of the ex-
change. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
When property is exchanged for property in a taxable exchange the
taxpayer is taxed on the difference between the adjusted basis of the
property given in exchange and the fair market value of the property
received in exchange. For purposes of determining gain or loss the fair
market value of the property received is treated as cash and taxed ac-
cordingly. To maintain harmony with the fundamental purpose of
these sections, it is necessary to consider the fair market value of the
property received as the cost basis to the taxpayer. The failure to do so
would result in allowing the taxpayer a stepped-up basis, without pay-
ing a tax therefor, if the fair market value of the property received is
less than the fair market value of the property given, and the taxpayer
would be subjected to a double tax if the fair market value of the prop-
erty received is more than the fair market value of the property given.
By holding that the fair market value of the property received in a tax-
able exchange is the cost basis, the above discrepancy is avoided and
the basis of the property received will equal the adjusted basis of the
property given plus any gain recognized, or that should have been rec-
ognized, or minus any loss recognized, or that should have been
recognized. 7 6
The Court of Claims noted, however, that in most taxable
exchanges the same basis figure would result whether the tax-
payer used the value received or the value given up theory of
cost, since generally the value of "the two properties ex-
changed in an arms length transaction are either equal in fact,
or are presumed to be equal."77 And, in fact, the Court of
Claims said that if the value of the franchise received could not
be determined with reasonable certainty, then the fair market
value of the bridge given up should be established and pre-
sumed to be the value of the extended franchise (Principle II),
and hence the basis of that franchise.7 8 In such a case, the
court would end up using the literal value of the property given
up (the bridge) to determine the basis of the property received
(the franchise). But, in the final analysis, it remains the value
of the benefit received-albeit arrived at by reference to the
value of the benefit given up-that determines the basis of the
property received.
4. The Value Received Theory of Deductions
The term "paid or accrued"79 or "paid or incurred"80 as
75. Id. at 188.
76. Id. at 188-89.
77. Id. at 189.
78. Id.
79. See, for example, I.R.C. §§ 163, 164 (1976) which allow a taxpayer a de-
duction for interest or taxes "paid or accrued."
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used throughout the Code plays the analogous role for expendi-
tures resulting in immediate deduction that the term "cost"
plays for capital expenditures. In fact, the Regulations specifi-
cally define the cost basis of property as "the amount paid for
such property."81 Thus, when taxpayers "pay" a capital ex-
pense they get a cost basis; when they "pay" a current expense
they receive an immediate tax deduction. As the discussion of
the value received theory of cost made clear, courts have long
felt justified in stretching "the word 'cost' almost out of recog-
nizable shape" to make it mean the value at which property is
taken into income "in order to give the statute the quality of ra-
tionality."82 To achieve the same rational tax results in the
case of deductible items received as income, the amount "paid
or accrued" or "paid or incurred" must include the fair market
value of the in-kind benefit to the taxpayer.
To illustrate this theory, we can once again consider the
tax position of the doctor who receives $500 worth of personal
tax return preparation services from an accountant, in ex-
change for providing the accountant with medical services. The
doctor, of course, reports the $500 worth of services received in
gross income. But the tax consequences cannot stop there.
The doctor must also be treated as having paid $500 for the tax
preparation service and should be entitled under section 212(3)
to an itemized deduction in that amount.83 Only an irrational
tax system would tax a person who received $500 worth of ac-
counting services as in-kind compensation differently than a
taxpayer in the economically equivalent position of having re-
ceived $500 of cash compensation which the taxpayer used to
pay for the accounting services. Faced with this issue, Profes-
sor Brown certainly would feel justified in stretching the words
"paid or incurred," as used in section 212, "out of recognizable
shape to make [them] mean the amount at which the [account-
ing services were] taken into income, . . in order to give the
statute the quality of rationality."84
80. See, for example, I.R.C. § 162 (1976) (ordinary and necessary business
expenses) and § 212 (1976) (ordinary and necessary expenses for the produc-
tion of income), which allow a taxpayer a deduction for expenses "Paid or
incurred."
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (1960).
82. Brown, supra note 66, at 8. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying
text.
83. I.R.C. § 212(3) (1976) permits an individual a deduction for the "ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-... in
connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax."
84. See Brown, supra note 66.
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While the doctor literally paid for the accountant's services
by furnishing medical services to the accountant, it is not the
literal worth of the services given up that determines the
amount of the deduction, but rather 'the value of the services
received and reported in income.8 5 This is clear from Philadel-
phia Park.86 Therefore, even if it were conclusively shown that
the doctor had given up $600 worth of medical services to ac-
quire only $500 of tax preparation services, the section 212(3)
deduction would remain $500-the value of the accountant's
services reported in income. To allow a deduction for the lit-
eral value of the services the doctor gave up would mean grant-
ing a deduction for an amount "paid" with untaxed dollars.
In essence, the value received theory of cost and the value
received theory of deductions are but one theory: Whenever a
taxable noncash economic benefit is received, the taxpayer
must be treated as if he or she paid an amount equivalent to
the value of the in-kind benefit. Thus, when a taxpayer re-
ceives title to property in a taxable transaction, the property's
fair market value is the amount includable in income and is
treated as the amount paid to acquire the property; the value of
the property received becomes the cost basis of the property in
the taxpayer's hands. Similarly, when a taxpayer receives the
deductible tax preparation services of an accountant in lieu of
cash income and includes the value of those services in gross
income, the value included is considered the amount paid to
the accountant for the latter's services.
If a taxpayer exchanges both cash and noncash considera-
tion for a deductible economic benefit, the proper analysis
should be identical to that used for bargain purchases of prop-
erty. Our doctor, for example, might have performed services
and paid $100 cash to acquire the accountant's tax preparing
services worth $500. In that case, the doctor would report $400
of income and deduct $500 as an itemized deduction. The $500
deduction includes $400' for the value of the accountant's in-
kind services to the doctor includable in the latter's gross in-
come (Principle IV)87 plus the $100 the doctor actually paid for
85. By analogy, see the discussion of the value received theory of cost,
supra text accompanying notes 66-78.
86. 126 F. Supp. at 188. While Philadelphia Park dealt with the value re-
ceived theory of cost, its reasoning is equally applicable in determining the
amount of the available deduction in a barter exchange.
87. In a barter transaction in which cash is included as part of the ex-
change, the value of the in-kind benefit received by the barterer who also gave
some cash in return is the difference between the benefit's fair market value
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the services.8 8
5. The No-Wash Principle
The basic structure of our tax system involves setting out
items of gross income and then listing deductions therefrom.
Therefore, whether the inclusion of an in-kind benefit in a bar-
terer's income would entitle a taxpayer (under Principle IV) to
claim an equal current deduction should be entirely irrelevant
to the determination that the taxpayer received an item of
gross income in the first place.
If, for example, Individual A exchanges inventory for B's
deductible services, Principle I dictates that A has gross in-
come to report from the sale of inventory equal to the fair mar-
ket value of the services received from B. Furthermore,
Principle IV permits A to claim an equal business deduction in
the amount of the value of B's services. This final principle
makes it clear that A must separately report the income and
deduction items. Principles I and IV operate independently
and may not be combined to create a wash transaction in which
neither the income nor the deduction items need be listed. It is
theoretically no more appropriate for Individual A to exclude
the value of B's deductible services from income in the de-
scribed barter exchange, than it would be for A to exclude cash
income derived from the same inventory simply because A
used the cash to purchase the deductible services of B.
As the following discussion illustrates, however, it is not
simply a matter of theoretically correct reporting that justifies
the requirement that taxpayers always list both income and de-
duction items. It is often a matter of considerable substantive
importance.
a. The Audit Issue
From an administrative viewpoint, the most obvious reason
for requiring taxpayers to list on their tax returns what they
consider to be the equal income and deduction items resulting
from a barter exchange is to enable the Service to audit the re-
turns properly and to determine if the taxpayer was, in fact,
correct. For example, what a taxpayer may think is a currently
and the amount of cash paid for it. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text.
88. In addition to the value of the in-kind benefit received, the amount
"paid or accrued" or 'paid or incurred" also includes amounts actually paid or
incurred in the literal sense of these words.
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deductible business expense may, in fact, prove on examina-
tion to be a nondeductible personal or capital expenditure. But
if the return on its face shows neither the income nor the de-
duction items, such an examination is unlikely to occur. If tax-
payers were allowed to omit reporting items of gross income
whenever they had a "reasonable basis"89 to believe that the
inclusion of that income item would entitle them to an offset-
ting current deduction, the Service's audit capability would be
severely diminished. Furthermore, a taxpayer's conclusion that
a barter transaction results in a total wash for tax purposes
could be erroneous for a variety of reasons.
b. An Equal Deduction is Not Available
While in every barter transaction, taxpayers should be
treated as having paid for the in-kind benefit they receive
(Principles M and IV), that, of course, does not mean they will
always be entitled to a current deduction for the amount that
they are deemed to have paid. Obviously, if a taxpayer ex-
changes services for the personal services of a plumber, the
taxpayer should properly report the value of the plumber's
services as income without the benefit of any offsetting deduc-
tion.90 Similarly, if the services received are those of a doctor,
the recipient can claim an offsetting deduction only if he or she
otherwise itemizes deductions 9' and his or her other medical
expenses exceed three percent of adjusted gross income.92
Moreover, a barter exchange might result in a situation
where the taxpayer would be entitled to a deduction equal to
the income reportable, but the deduction would be properly
available only over a period of time. An example would be a
situation in which a taxpayer exchanges inventory for the serv-
ices of an architect who designs the taxpayer's new factory
building. The taxpayer would have current income from the
sale of the inventory but would be required to capitalize the
cost of the architect's services 93 and take depreciation deduc-
89. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 314, 51 A.B.A.J. 671 (1961);
Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client That He May Take a Position on
His Tax Return?, 29 TAX LAw. 237 (1976).
90. I.R.C. § 262 (1976) states that: "Except as otherwise expressly provided
in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family
expenses."
91. See supra note 14.
92. Medical expenses must exceed five percent of adjusted gross income to
be deductible, effective with taxable years beginning after December 31, 1982.
See supra note 17.
93. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(d) (1960).
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tions over the life of the new factory building.94 A system per-
mitting taxpayers to exclude both the income and deduction
items would in effect allow taxpayers to expense items re-
quired to be capitalized.
There are also situations where the deemed payment
under Principle IV would not give rise to a deduction, notwith-
standing its relation to the taxpayer's business. For example, if
Individual A swaps services for the business related services of
Individual B, Individual A would normally have both income
and a current deduction. But if Individual B were a govern-
ment official and the payment constituted an illegal bribe, In-
dividual A would not be entitled to an offsetting deduction by
reason of section 162(c) (1).95
c. The Income to Be Reported is Capital Gain
Taxpayers would be disadvantaged if they were required to
exclude both the income and deduction items in a barter ex-
change that resulted in the realization of capital gain and an or-
dinary business deduction. Assume, for example, that
Individual A, a fifty percent bracket taxpayer, owns stock with
a basis of $1,000 and a value of $4,000, which A trades for the
currently deductible services of Individual B. Individual A
should be taxed as if A sold the stock for $4,000 and then used
the $4,000 to purchase the services. A, therefore, should report
$3,000 of capital gain and $4,000 in business deductions. Assum-
ing the $3,000 is long term capital gain, a fifty percent tax brack-
et taxpayer would have a tax liability of $600. The $4,000,
however, would decrease the same taxpayer's taxes by $2,000,
for a net reduction in taxes of $1,400 on the transaction. If, on
the other hand, the taxpayer netted the $3,000 capital gain
against the $4,000 deduction and claimed a deduction of only
$1,000 on his or her tax return, the taxpayer's tax savings would
be only $500.
94. Under the new Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), the factory
building could be depreciated over 15 years using either straight line deprecia-
tion or the 175-declining balance method, switching to straight line at the time
that will maximize the deductions. See I.R.C. § 168(b) (1) (B) (2) (Supp. 1982).
95. LR.C. § 162(c) (1) (1976) states, in part, that "no deduction shall be al-
lowed under [§ 1621 for any payment made, directly or indirectly, to an official
or employee of any government ... if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe
or kickback. ... "
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d. The Exchange Affects the Amount of a Taxpayer's
Itemized Deductions
In our complex tax system, some deductions are allowable
in computing an individual's adjusted gross income, while
others are allowable only as itemized deductions from adjusted
gross income. 96 Where a barter exchange produces income and
an equal itemized deduction, the omission of both items would
often have significant tax repercussions. For example, a mar-
ried taxpayer having $3,000 of itemized deductions for the year
who exchanges property or services for $500 worth of services
for which an additional itemized deduction is permitted is enti-
tled to deduct only $100 of the $500 worth of services acquired.
Analyzed as a two-payment transaction, this exchange in-
creases the taxpayer's taxable income by $400. A no income, no
deduction rule, on the other hand, would not cause an increase
in the taxpayer's taxable income at all.
Even if a married taxpayer's itemized deductions otherwise
exceed $3,400, so that an additional itemized deduction would
be fully deductible, the very inclusion of an additional item of
gross income could affect the taxpayer's itemized deductions
for medical expenses and charitable contributions. Medical de-
ductions are limited to the amount which exceeds three per-
cent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income.97 If the adjusted
gross income, therefore, is not increased by the in-kind benefit
received, the medical deduction may be overstated. If, for ex-
ample, a taxpayer with medical expenses well in excess of
three percent of adjusted gross income receives $500 of in-kind
tax preparation services in a barter exchange, the taxpayer
should: (i) increase adjusted gross income by the $500 value of
the services received; (ii) claim a $500 itemized deduction for
tax return preparation; and (iii) reduce* otherwise allowable
medical deductions by $15 (three percent of the $500 of addi-
tional adjusted gross income). The no income, no deduction
approach would result in giving the taxpayer $15 more in medi-
cal deductions than he or she is entitled to. On the other hand,
a no income, no deduction approach could understate the
amount of a taxpayer's charitable deductions, since the Code
limits the maximum amount permitted as a charitable deduc-
tion to a percentage of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 98
96. See I.R.C. § 62 (1976).
97. LR.C. § 213(a) (1) (1976). See supra note 17.
98. See I.R.C. § 170(b) (1976).
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e. The Exchange Affects Whether Certain Code Sections
Apply
Even where the receipt of an in-kind benefit would entitle
the taxpayer (under Principle IV) to an equal deduction in
computing his or her adjusted gross income, including the item
in gross income could have important tax repercussions. For
example, section 6501(e) extends the running of the normal
three-year statute of limitations to six years where a taxpayer
"omits from gross income an amount properly includible
therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross
income stated in the return."
99
Moreover, an increase in gross income may cause problems
of qualification for a subchapter S corporationOO or could gen-
erate personal holding company problems for a corporate bar-
terer. Section 1372(e) (5) (A) states that a subchapter S
election terminates in any year in which a corporation has
gross receipts, more than twenty percent of which is passive in-
vestment income. Such income includes "gross receipts de-
rived from.., rents.., interest,.., and sales or exchanges
of stock or securities."O1 Thus, if a subchapter S corporation
exchanges stock or securities, or the use of its monetary or
nonmonetary property, for immediately deductible business
items, the exchange could jeopardize the subchapter S election.
That the exchange generates an equal deduction is immaterial
to the application of this provision.
Similarly, the classification of a corporation as a personal
holding company depends, in part, on the amount of its gross
income derived from rents, interest, and personal service con-
tracts.102 If a corporate barterer were entitled to omit such
gross income items because it would be entitled under Princi-
ple IV to an equal deduction, the personal holding company
rules could be avoided.
Finally, a number of Code sections provide tax breaks to
certain taxpayers, usually based on their adjusted gross in-
99. I.R.C. § 6501(e) (1976).
100. LR.C. § 1372(e) (5) (A) (1976).
101. LR.C. § 1372(e) (5) (C) (1976). See generally B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCoME TAXATION OF CoPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 6.03, at 6-14
(4th ed. 1979) (termination of election under subchapter S).
102. Section 542(a) (2) defines a "personal holding company" as any corpo-
ration where "[alt least 60 percent of its adjusted ordinary gross income... is
personal holding company income." LR.C. § 542(a) (1) (1967). Under I.R.C.
§ 543(a) (1976), personal holding company income includes, inter alia, interest
and rents. See generally B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 101, 8.22.
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comes. For example, whether taxpayers must include unem-
ployment compensation benefits in gross income depends on
the amount of their adjusted gross income. In general, under
section 85, if a married taxpayer's unemployment compensa-
tion and adjusted gross income exceeds $18,000, part of the un-
employment compensation received becomes taxable
income.103 Similarly, under section 105(d) of the CodelO4 the
determination whether certain disability payments are includi-
ble in a taxpayer's gross income depends on the amount of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income.105 If taxpayers did not have
to report in-kind benefits in income because theywould be en-
titled to an itemized deduction equal to the value of the in-kind
benefit received (under Principle IV), they could avoid the in-
tended income restrictions of sections 85 and 105.
C. THE VALUE RECEIVED THEORY OF DEDUCTIONS AND THE No-
WASH PRINCIPLE
The two-payment analysis demonstrates that every barter
exchange should be treated the same as its economically
equivalent cash transaction.106 To achieve tax parity between
barter and cash transactions, the courts and the Service should
consistently adhere to the five tax principles described in the
previous section. This section of the Article discusses current
law regarding barter exchanges, with particular focus on the
103. The part of the unemployment compensation included is the lesser of
one-half of the amount of the excess over $18,000 or the amount of the unem-
ployment compensation. I.R.C. § 85(a) (1976 & Supp. 1980), amended by
TEFRA, supra note 17, § 611.
104. I.R.C. §§ 105(d) (1) & (3) (Supp. 1982) read as follows:
(d) Certain disability payments.
(1) In general.-In the case of a taxpayer who-
(A) has not attained age 65 before the close of the taxable year, and
(B) retired on disability and, when he retired, was permanently and
totally disabled,
Gross income does not include amounts referred to in sub-
section (a) if such amounts constitute wages or payments in
lieu of wages for a period during which the employee is ab-
sent from work on account of permanent and total
disability.
(3) Phaseout over $15,000.-If the adjusted gross income of the
taxpayer for the taxable year (determined without regard to
this subsection and section 221) exceeds $15,000, the amount
which but for this paragraph would be excluded under this
subsection for the taxable year shall be reduced by an
amount equal to the excess of the adjusted gross income (as
so determined) over $15,000.
105. I.R.C. § 105(d) (3) (Supp. 1982). See supra note 104.
106. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
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last two of these principles: Principle IV, the value received
theory of deductions, and Principle V, the no-wash principle.
Taxpayers, the Service, and the courts have suggested a
number of different solutions to deal with various barter ex-
changes. The various approaches can be classified as: (1) "The
Deduction Without Income Approach;" (2) "The Income With-
out Deduction Approach;" (3) "The No Income, No Deduction
Approach;" and (4) "The Both Income and Deduction Ap-
proach" (the two-payment solution).
To illustrate the various approaches, assume a barter ex-
change in which Individuals A and B swap currently deductible
business services. The deduction without income approach
would permit A and B each to claim a deduction for the value
of the other's services without requiring them first to report the
value of those services in income. The equally asymmetric in-
come without deduction approach would require each to report
the value of the other's services in income but would not allow
either to claim any offsetting deduction. The remaining two ap-
proaches would require A and B either to report the value of
the other's services in income and claim a business deduction
in the same amount (both income and deduction approach) or
to omit both the income and deduction items from their returns
(no income, no deduction approach).
The two asymmetrical approaches, the income without de-
duction approach and the deduction without income approach,
seem patently absurd. There is surely no rational reason why
barter recipients should be better off (in the case of the deduc-
tion without income approach) or worse off (in the case of the
income without deduction approach) than they would have
been had they received cash and used it to pay for the eco-
nomic benefit received.
These approaches, in fact, seem so unjustified that it is
hard to imagine that either taxpayers or the Service would
have seriously urged them. But taxpayers have actually ad-
vanced the deduction without income approach in two types of
barter exchanges: the exchange of services for property 0 7 and
the exchange of services for the rent-free use of property.108
Moreover, the Service consistently has advanced the income
without deduction approach in another type of barter transac-
tion: the exchange of the use of money for services, a transac-
tion more commonly referred to as the interest-free loan
107. See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
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between employer and employee.109
While no court has ever accepted the deduction without in-
come approach," 0 a trial judge in the Court of Claims recently
afirmed the Service's income without deduction approach in
an interest-free loan case. 1' But even those courts that have
rejected both asymmetric approaches have not determined con-
clusively whether our tax law includes a value received theory
of deductions, and consequently have left open the issue
whether barter exchanges for deductible items should be re-
ported by using the two-payment approach or the "no income,
no deduction approach."" 2
Three of the four possible approaches are illustrated in the
1941 case of International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 113
in which a corporation transferred 150 shares of marketable
DuPont stock to its employees under a bonus plan. The stock
had a basis to the taxpayer corporation of $16,153 and a value of
$24,858 at the time of delivery. The taxpayer claimed a $24,858
deduction but did not report any gain on the disposition of the
stock (the deduction without income approach). The Service at
first did not argue that the corporation had realized a taxable
gain on the disposition of its DuPont stock;114 rather, the Serv-
ice argued that the proper amount of the deduction was only
the $16,153 cost of the stock transferred. This was essentially a
no income, no deduction approach. Before the Board of Tax
Appeals," 5 however, the Service made an alternative argument
that if the court held that the taxpayer was, in fact, entitled to a
$24,858 fair market value deduction, then it should also hold
that the taxpayer realized a taxable gain of $8,705 (the $24,858
value of the stock less its $16,153 basis) on the disposition of
the DuPont stock (both income and deduction approach)." 6
The Board of Tax Appeals concluded that the Commis-
109. See infra notes 137-66 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
111. Hardee v. United States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9459 (Ct. CL 1982).
See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
112. Compare International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310,
313-14 (2d Cir. 1943) (two payment approach) and United States v. General
Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 14 (6th Cir. 1960) (same) with Bellows v. Commissioner,
26 T.C.M. (CCH) 978, 980 (1967) (no income, no deduction approach) and
Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 946 (1979) (same) and Martin v. Com-
missioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981) (same).
113. 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
114. Id. at 312.
115. International, Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 716 (1941),
aj'd, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
116. Id. at 720.
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sioner's alternative argument was correct,1 17 and the Second
Circuit affirmed. 18 With respect to the gain issue, the Second
Circuit reasoned that the receipt of the employees' services
constituted an "amount realized" under the predecessor of sec-
tion 1001(b). 119 It rejected the taxpayer's argument that, since
the term "amount realized" was defined as the sum of "any
money received plus the fair market value of the property
(other than money) received," services could not be in-
cluded.120 The court noted that while literally the corporation
received no property or money, the receipt of its employees'
services nevertheless should be considered a receipt of
money's worth as required by the statute.121 Moreover, in ac-
cord with Principle II, the Second Circuit concluded that the
value of the employees' services received should be assumed to
be equal to the $24,858 value of the stock transferred.122
Subsequent cases involving voluntary transfers of appreci-
ated property by corporations to employees' retirement
trusts123 have consistently followed the International Freight-
ing Corp. decision and have rejected taxpayers' attempts to
claim a fair market value compensation deduction without also
reporting the gain on the transferred property. For example, in
United States v. General Shoe Corp., 124 a corporation contrib-
uted appreciated real estate to such a trust and claimed the fair
market value of the real estate as a business deduction, without
also reporting the previously unrealized appreciation as in-
come. The Sixth Circuit, analogizing to the transaction's eco-
nomically equivalent two-payment exchange, held that the
deduction was appropriate but that the income had to be
reported:
The taxpayer realized exactly the same gain here by transferring the
real estate as it would have had it sold the real estate for the fair mar-
ket (or appraised) value and contributed the funds to the trust. Would
the taxpayer say that if it had sold the real estate that there would
have been no taxable capital gain in this situation? Can a taxpayer cir-
cumvent the capital gains tax by such a simple device?.. . To argue,
as the taxpayer does here, that there can be no gain because nothing is
realized, is unrealistic. Literally the taxpayer is correct in its conten-
117. Id. at 720-21.
118. 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
119. Id. at 313-14.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 313.
122. Id.
123. E.g., United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
124. 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960).
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tion that it did not receive a tangible benefit.., however, we do not
conceive that in this day and age we are restricted to tangibles in tax
matters where there is actual recognizable benefit, albeit intangible,
the taxation of which is implicit in the statutory scheme, and where
such benefit is clearly capable of being evaluated on an objective basis
[by looking to the value of what was given up] .125
Thus, the appreciated property-for-services cases represent
not only a clear rejection of the asymmetrical deduction with-
out income approach in barter cases but also a clear acceptance
of the two-payment approach over the no income, no deduction
approach. Moreover, these cases, when read in conjunction
with the Philadelphia Park decision,12 6 are also firm authority
for the value received theory of deductions. Although the
courts in International Freighting Corp. and its progeny gener-
ally speak of the amount of the deduction as being the fair mar-
ket value of the property given up,127 rather than that of the
services received, that is only because, on the facts of those
cases, the courts were forced to use the value given up to deter-
mine the value of the benefit received in accordance with the
presumed equivalence in value theory.128 Surely, if property
that was difficult to value was transferred in exchange for de-
ductible services with a readily ascertainable value, a court, by
analogy to Philadelphia Park, would conclude that the property
transferor should claim a deduction in the amount of the value
of the services received, without regard to any proof of the lit-
eral value of the property given up to acquire that benefit.129
Another group of cases in which the courts have rejected
taxpayers' attempts to use the deduction without income ap-
proach involves the exchange of the rent-free use of property
for services. 3 0 These cases, however, do not clearly support
either the both income and deduction approach or the no in-
come, no deduction approach.
For example, in Bellows v. Commissioner, 131 Mrs. Bellows,
125. Id. at 12.
126. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184
(Ct. Cl. 1954). See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d at
313.
128. See, e.g., United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d at 13; Interna-
tional Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d at 313; Tasty Baking Co. v.
United States, 393 F.2d at 995.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
130. See, .e.g., Reynard Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 552, 559 (1938);
Reynard Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 B.TA. 451, 454 (1934); Solon v. Commis-
sioner, 39 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1245, 1250 (1980); Bellows v. Commis-
sioner, 26 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 978, 980 (1967).
131. 26 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 978 (1967).
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who owned two apartment buildings, deducted the fair rental
value of an apartment occupied rent free by a couple who per-
formed managerial and janitorial services for the two buildings.
Mrs. Bellows had not reported any rental income on the trans-
actions (the deduction without income approach). The Service
simply denied her the deduction (the no income, no deduction
approach), apparently not arguing, as it did in the property-for-
services cases, that Mrs. Bellows should include the fair rental
value of the apartment in income and take an equivalent de-
duction for compensation paid (the both income and deduction
approach).
The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's no income, no
deduction approach, but apparently only because the tax con-
sequences would have been no different under the two pay-
ment approach.132 The Tax Court approvingly cited United
States v. General Shoe Corp. and International Freighting
Corp. v. Commissioner for the proposition that "where property
is used to pay for an item of deductible expense, the transac-
tion gives rise not only to a deduction but also to the realization
of income on such use of the property."133
The Tax Court stated further that the taxpayer should be
in the same position when she pays for deductible services
with the rent-free use of her property as she would be if she
had paid "cash to the [employees] as compensation for their
services and [then] charged them an equal amount as rent."134
Having said this, however, the Tax Court noted that in the par-
ticular case, denying the deduction to the taxpayer achieved
the same result as permitting the deduction and charging the
taxpayer with an equivalent amount of income: "Whether the
situation is viewed as one requiring that the deduction for the
fair rental value be offset by an equal amount of realized taxa-
ble income or simply a denial of the deduction, respondent's
determination as to the rental issue must be sustained."135 In
132. See id. at 980.
133. Id. See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
134. 26 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 980.
135. I& The Board of Tax Appeals had reached the same results, based on
equivalent two-payment reasoning, in. Reynard Corp. v. Commissioner, 37
B.TA. 552 (1938). In that case the president of the Reynard Corporation, Fon-
taine Fox, occupied a dwelling owned by the corporation. Id. at 556. The occu-
pancy was regarded as a part of his compensation for services and the
corporation claimed the $3,000 fair rental value of the property as a business
deduction for compensation paid. Id. at 557. No rental income was reported by
the corporation from this transaction. Id. at 559. The Board concluded that the
corporation could not take a $3,000 deduction for compensation paid unless it
first reported the $3,000 as rental income:
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
considering this statement in Bellows, it is significant to recall
that, in the property-for-services cases, where the two ap-
proaches would not have led to the same net tax consequences,
since the gain on the property would have been capital, while
the equal deduction would have been ordinary, the courts have
specifically sanctioned the both income and deduction
approach.136
In the interest-free loan cases, the Service has consistently
argued for the asymmetrical income without deduction ap-
proach. And until recently, every court that has considered the
question has rejected the Service's position in favor of a no in-
come, no deduction approach. The Service has argued in these
cases that an employee who receives a compensatory interest-
free loan has income equal to the fair market value of the use
of the employer's money but cannot claim an interest deduc-
tion for the interest not literally paid. 37 In other words, the
Service adheres to Principal I, that all economic benefits re-
gardless of form are includable in gross income, but rejects
Principle IV, the value received theory of deductions. 38 In fact,
in disallowing the employee an interest deduction, the Service
implicitly rejects the theory that an individual can "pay" an ex-
pense in services, as well as in cash, and claim a deduction for
If Reynard had rented the dwelling to Fox and had received $3,000
cash therefor during the taxable year there would be no question but
that the amount would be includable in income as rent. If during the
taxable year Reynard had paid the $3,000 to Fox as a part of reasonable
compensation for his services there would be no question but that such
payment would constitute a deductible expenditure. The net effect of
the two items would be to offset each other, and Reynard's net income
apart from them in no wise would be affected. Instead of making cash
payments to each other, Reynard gave Fox the use of the house for
services and Fox rendered to Reynard the required services for the use
of the house.... The only theory upon which it can be held that Reyn-
ard paid the $3,000 to Fox is that it offset that amount against a like
amount owed to it by Fox for house rent. Under this theory the rental
value of the house was income to petitioner and, if the deduction
claimed is to be allowed, such income must be accounted for in deter-
mining its correct tax liability. To allow Reynard a deduction of the
$3,000 on any other theory would be allowing a deduction for an
amount which it neither paid nor was obligated to pay. Therefore,
since Reynard is not charged for tax purposes with income from house
rent it is not entitled to deduct the amount thereof as compensation
paid to Fox.
Id. at 558-59.
136. See supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 950-51 (1979), affd,
670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Keller, Tax Treatmen4 supra note 5, at
259-61 (criticizing Service's argument that a taxpayer's receipt of an interest
free loan results in realization of taxable income but does not entitle taxpayer
to a deduction).
138. See Keller, Tax Treatment, supra note 5, at 259-61.
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the value of the services given up. In other words, to say that
an employee receiving an interest-free loan has not literally
"paid" interest is to say that one can never pay expenses in
kind. This conclusion is clearly incorrect. The Regulations spe-
cifically state that expenditures "need not be in the form of
cash." 3 9
The Service's posture in the interest-free loan cases is par-
ticularly puzzling since it has never advanced the same asym-
metrical income without deduction approach in any other
barter transaction. For example, in the services for property
cases, such as International Freighting Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 140 the employer-taxpayer initially took the position that
it was entitled to a deduction equal to the fair market value of
the appreciated property transferred as compensation, even
though it did not have to report gain on the disposition of the
property. The Service countered that either the employer had
to report the gain as well as the deduction (the both income
and deduction approach) or claim only a basis deduction (the
no income, no deduction approach). It never argued, as it does
in the interest-free loan cases, that the taxpayer had to report
gain but could only claim a basis deduction (the income with-
out a deduction approach).
Similarly, in the rent-free use of property for services
cases, like Bellows, 141 the Service simply denied an employer-
landlord a deduction for compensation paid, where the em-
ployer did not report the value of the services received as
rental income. If the Service acted consistently with its posi-
tion in the interest-free loan cases, it not only would have de-
nied Mrs. Bellows the deduction for the compensation paid, but
it also would have charged her with the rental income. This, it
did not do.'42
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a) (3) (1957). This section states that "[i]tems of
gross income and expenditures which are elements in the computation of taxa-
ble income need not be in the form of cash. It is sufficient that such items can
be valued in terms of money." Id.
140. 45 B.T.A. 716 (1941), affd, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943). See supra notes
113-22 and accompanying text.
141. 26 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 978 (1967). See supra notes 131-36 and
accompanying text.
142. In Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 CB. 60, see supra notes 32-34 and accompany-
ing text, the Service managed to avoid the deduction issue entirely. In Situa-
tion 1 of the ruling it clearly stated that a painter and lawyer were exchanging
'personal" nondeductible services, and thus no discussion of deductions was
necessary. Id. at 60. In Situation 2, a landlord received a painting from an art-
ist in exchange for which the artist obtained the rent-free use of an apartment
for six months. The Service stated only that both parties to the exchange real-
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The Service's treatment of the employee in the interest-
free loan cases has even been inconsistent with its own treat-
ment of the employer in the same transaction. The Service has
apparently been content to allow the employer making an in-
terest-free loan to report neither interest income nor a deduc-
tion for compensation paid. 43 Yet, if it acted consistently with
its position regarding the employee, the Service should have re-
quired the employer in these situations to report the value of
the employee's services received as interest income but denied
the employer a business deduction for the services for which it
did not literally pay.
Oddly, it appears that the initial reporting position of the
taxpayer in these barter cases has determined the Service's re-
sponse. In the property for services and the rent free use of
property for services cases, where the taxpayer advanced a de-
duction without income result, the Service countered with the
no income, no deduction result, or the both income and deduc-
tion result.144 On the other hand, in the interest-free loan
cases, where the taxpayer initially advanced a no income, no
deduction result, the Service countered with an income but no
deduction result. Ironically, the employees in the interest-free
loan cases might have avoided their difficulties with the Service
had they initially placed themselves in the untenable position
of claiming an interest deduction without reporting the value of
the interest-free loan as income (the deduction without income
approach).
From 1961 until 1982, every court that considered the prob-
lem of the interest-free loan rejected the Service's asymmetric
income without a deduction approach. 45 Given the consistent
ized income. The landlord would, of course, under the value received theory of
cost take a basis in the painting equal to the value of the painting taken into
income (although this was not mentioned in the ruling). No deduction would
be available to the landlord. A deduction issue could arise, however, for the
artist, but only if the artist used the premises as a studio or for some other de-
ductible purpose. The ruling makes no such assumption.
143. See Keller, Tax Treatment, supra note 5, at 287-97.
144. See supra notes 113-16, 131-32 and accompanying text.
145. See Baker v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 166 (1980), af'd, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1982); Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), affd sub nor. Martin v. Com-
missioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009
(1979), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981);
Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979), af'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir.
1982); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), nonacq. 1973-2 C.B. 4; Ruwe v.
Commissioner, 41 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1458 (1981); Beaton v. Commis-
sioner, 40 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1324 (1980), aff4d, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.
1981); Parks v. Commissioner, 40 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1228 (1980); Estate
of Liechtung v. Commissioner, 40 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1118 (1980); Martin
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rejection of the Service's position for more than twenty years,
the inherent irrationality of the approach, and the Service's in-
consistent application in analogous situations, the recent deci-
sion by a trial judge in the Court of Claims accepting the
Service's position is somewhat shocking. In Hardee v. United
States, 146 the trial judge concluded, contrary to prior case law,
that interest-free loans from a closely held corporation to its
shareholders resulted in gross income to those shareholders.
In a holding of equal significance, the judge also held that the
shareholder-borrowers could not claim an offsetting deduction
for interest they did not literally pay. The judge specifically re-
jected the value received theory of deductions as a fiction,
while at the same time noting that if the loan had actually been
structured as two separate transactions-a cash dividend pay-
ment combined with a cash interest payment on the loan-an
interest deduction presumably would have been allowed.147
Since the Hardee case involved interest-free loans to share-
holders, it is unclear whether the Court of Claims-assuming it
adopts the decision of its trial judge-would extend its no de-
duction result to a case in which the loan recipient was an em-
ployee. In the latter situation, the court conceivably might
grant the employee an offsetting deduction for the interest lit-
erally paid in kind with services.14 8 To make such a distinction
between an employee and a shareholder, however, misses the
very essence and rationale of the value received theory of de-
ductions-that it is the value of the benefit received and re-
ported as income that supports the deduction, and not the quid
pro quo, if any, given in exchange for the benefit received.149
Prior to the Hardee decision, the Tax Court150 and four cir-
cuit courts'51 had rejected the Service's income without a de-
duction approach in cases involving low-interest and interest-
free loans to both employees and shareholders. But those
cases created their own problems by accepting a no income, no
v. Commissioner, 39 TAx CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 531 (1979), affd, 649 F.2d 1133
(5th Cir. 1981); Suttle v. Commissioner, 37 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1638
(1978), affd, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); cf. Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317
(1979) (interest-free loan part of a purchase agreement), nonacq. 1980-2 C.B. 2.
See generally Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 5 (distinguishing term from de-
mand loans); Keller, Tax Treatment. supra note 5 (two transaction approach to
taxation of interest-free loans).
146. 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459 (Ct. CL 1982).
147. See id.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
149. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
150. See cases cited supra note 145.
151. See id.
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deduction solution, rather than a both income and deduction
approach. That is, the courts in all those cases prior to Hardee
concluded that the loan recipient had neither income nor a de-
duction. They reasoned that a no income result was appropri-
ate, since if a taxpayer were actually to pay interest on the
loan, the taxpayer would be entitled to a deduction that would
offset any income reported. 5 2
The courts were apparently concerned that, if they were to
include the economic benefit derived from the interest-free
loan in a taxpayer's income, they could not then have granted
the taxpayer a deduction for interest not literally owed or
paid. 53 To avoid the harsh income without a deduction ap-
proach of the Service, the courts simply adopted the wash ap-
proach and did not charge the taxpayer with income.15 4 Thus,
these courts' refusal to adopt the two-payment approach in in-
terest-free loan cases seems clearly to stem from their errone-
ous belief, shared by the Court of Claims, that our tax system
contains no value received theory of deductions.15
Interestingly, however, the clearest judicial expositions of
the justification for the value received theory of deductions are
found in opinions in two recent interest-free loan cases. One is
the majority opinion of Judge Fay in the 1979 Tax Court case of
Greenspun v. Commissioner.156 The other is Judge Goldberg's
dissenting opinion in Martin v. Commissioner, ' 5 7 decided by
the Fifth Circuit in 1981. In Greenspun, Judge Fay, the trial
judge, was apparently in favor of abandoning the no income, no
deduction principle first established in interest-free loan cases
in Dean v. Commissioner, 158 but he could not convince a major-
ity of the Tax Court to go along with him.159 He therefore
wrote a "majority" opinion, which clearly justified the adoption
of a two-payment approach, but which ended up affirming
Dean.160 Nevertheless, Fay, to show where he actually stood
on the issue, listed his name along with three other concurring
judges, who actually would have overturned Dean.161 With re-
spect to the Service's argument that no deduction would be al-
152. See id.
153. See Keller, Tax Treatment; supra note 5, at 261-63.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 261-63, 271-72.
156. 72 T.C. 931 (1979).
157. 649 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
158. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), nonacq. 1973-2 CJB. 4.
159. See Keller, Tax Treatment supra note 5, at 270 n.107.
160. See id.
161. 72 T.C. at 954. See Keller, Tax Treatment supra note 5, at 270 n.107.
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lowed to a taxpayer even if the taxpayer actually reported the
economic benefit of the interest-free loan in income, Judge Fay
said:
With respect to respondent's contention that petitioner would not
be entitled to an offsetting interest deduction under section 163(a), we
recognize that as a general rule a cash basis taxpayer may not deduct
interest unless such interest has actually been paid pursuant to a legal
obligation [citations omitted]. However, none of the cases which have
applied the general rule have dealt with the precise question of
whether a taxpayer who must report as income the economic benefit
associated with a low or no-interest loan is entitled to claim an offset-
ting interest deduction. in such a case, we think an exception to the
general rule of deductibility is both appropriate and necessary to give
recognition to the economic realities of the transaction. 162
More recently, Judge Goldberg, in a forceful dissent to the
Fifth Circuit's affirmance of Dean in Martin v. Commissioner, 163
also set forth the justification for the two-transaction approach
and the value received theory of deductions. The majority of
the court suggested that adopting the value received theory of
deductions and the two-payment approach in lieu of the Dean
no income approach simply substituted one fiction for an-
other.164 Judge Goldberg responded:
This illogical and unjust [no income] result is neither required by
nor even permitted under a fair and proper application of the Internal
Revenue Code. Rather, once it is recognized that the receipt of an in-
terest-free loan is equivalent to the receipt of additional income by
which to "purchase" the loan, it must also be recognized that having
received an interest-free loan is equivalent to having paid the interest
on that loan.1
6 5
Judge Goldberg rationalized the value received theory of de-
duction by reference to the same arguments advanced in this
Article-that the value received theory of deductions is per-
fectly analogous to the value received theory of cost and that
both are necessary in order to give the statute "the quality of
rationality."166
D. CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING DIRECT BARTER TRANSACTIONS
This part of the Article argued that every direct barter ex-
change should be taxed the same as its economically
equivalent two-payment cash transaction, in which each party
purchases the other's goods or services for cash. It demon-
162. 72 T.C. at 951.
163. 649 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
164. 649 F.2d at 1133.
165. Id. at 1137.
166. Id. at 1143 n.17 (quoting Keller, Tax Consequences, supra note 5, at
242).
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strated that to reach these logical tax results in all cases, five
basic tax principles must be consistently followed. Of these
five principles, both the courts and the Service have readily ac-
cepted three. The viability of the other two-the value received
theory of deductions and the no-wash principle-are in need of
clarification, however.
If the full Court of Claims adopts the decision of the trial
judge in Hardee, and the taxpayer applies for, and the Supreme
Court grants certiorari in that case, the high court will become
the final arbiter in the interest-free loan area. In that event, it
is hoped the Supreme Court will approve the propriety of ap-
plying Principles I (The Taxability of All Noncash Benefits), IV
(The'Value Received Theory of Deductions), and V (The No-
Wash Principle), not only to all interest-free loan cases but, by
analogy, to every direct barter transaction.
11. THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF BARTERING
THROUGH TADE EXCHANGES
Although barter is as old as man, old direct trading meth-
ods have recently given way to new computerized systems and
new sophistication. Trade exchanges, also referred to as barter
clubs or barter exchanges, are the newest wrinkle in the barter
business.167 No longer does a dentist who wants to swap serv-
ices with a plumber have to go searching for a plumber with a
toothache. Rather, as a member of a trade exchange, the den-
tist can perform services for any exchange member, whether
merchant, lawyer, or plumber, and thereby earn "trade units"
which the dentist can immediately use to obtain services from
any member plumber. This part explains how such trade ex-
167. Barter clubs have in recent years, attracted considerable attention in
the media. See, e.g., Gallagher, Stamford Firm Trades on the Barter Instinct,
Fairpress (Stamford, Conn.), Aug. 19, 1981, at Al, coL 5; Knight, Swap and Shop:
Bartering Away the Middleman, Washington Post, July 23, 1981, at DI, coL 1;
Rankin, Taxes & Accounting, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1979, at D2, col. 1; Lef, Trad-
ing Flourishes on Many Exchanges You Never Heard Of, Wall St. J., Sept. 8,
1978, at 1, col. 4; Wells, Barter Clubs Become Big Business as Americans Cash In
On Their Skills, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1978, at D10, col. 1; Goodman, Barter: A
New Look For an Old Custom, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1978, at C16, coL 2; Lindsey,
It's the Newest Trade-Off: Bartering Your Services, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1976, at
48, col 1; Thompson, When Money Gets Tight Bargain by Barter, PURCHASING,
Nov. 7, 1979, at 91; Bartering Gets to Be a Business in the Billions, U.S. NEWS &
WoRLD REP., March 21, 1977, at 47; Using Barter as a Way of Doing Business,
Bus. WK., Aug. 4, 1980, at 57. Recent books in the area include P. STRASSELS &
R. WOOL, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE IRS 109-11 (1980); WLSON, LET'S
TRY BARTER (1976).
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changes operate and analyzes the tax consequences168 to the
Exchanges 169 and to the exchange members.
A. TRADE EXCHANGES AND How THEY OPERATE
A Trade Exchange provides a forum for, and arranges the
barter of, goods and services between the members of the ex-
change. Business and professional people become members of
the exchange by signing an agreement with the Exchange
under which they generally agree:
(i) to sell goods and services to other members, for trade
units, with each trade unit representing one dollar of "prevail-
ing price" or "prevailing retail price;"170
(ii) to pay the Exchange an initial fee, which is normally
about $25 to $50, and an annual charge of about $300; 171 and
(iii) to pay a commission, usually 10%, to the Exchange
on each acquisition of goods and services.172 The commission
is generally payable solely in trade units, although some Ex-
changes, finding themselves with cash flow difficulties, have re-
cently turned to cash commissions or commissions payable
partly in cash and partly in trade units.73
The trade unit is the medium of exchange of a trade ex-
change. Initially, the Trade Exchange issues all the trade units
itself.174 New members normally obtain their initial trade units
in one of two ways. Either they transfer goods or services to
the Exchange, which credits their account with trade units
168. A recent article has considered in some detail the antitrust implica-
tions of barter exchanges. See Allison, The Antitrust Implications of Barter, 58
Cm.-KENT L. REV. 89 (1981).
169. Hereinafter, when the owner of the exchange is referred to, the capital-
ized word "Exchange" or words "Trrade Exchange" will be used. The business
may be owned by an individual, a partnership, or a corporation. The member-
ship is not itself a legally recognized entity.
170. For example, the contract of Barter Systems International (BSI) uses
the term "prevailing prices," while that of Exchange Enterprises uses the
phrase "prevailing retail prices." Butcher Trade Exchange, Inc. (Fort Washing-
ton, Pa.), on the other hand, has no such language in its contract.
171. Annual membership fees, however, may range anywhere from $150 to
$1,000 a year. Quinn, IRS Is Tightening Up on Tax Avoidance Through Bar-
tering, Washington Post, November 16, 1981, (magazine) at 47.
172. The commission may vary between 5% and 10%. Id.
173. Id. For example, Butcher Trade Exchange, Inc. (Fort Washington, Pa.)
collects its commissions, 8% in cash and 2% in trade credits.
174. LTR 8216010, National Office Technical Advice Memorandum, Decem-
ber 31, 1981, reprinted in IRS Letter Rulings No. 269, April 28, 1982 (CCH); LTR
7945009, National Office Technical Advice Memorandum, August 1, 1979, re-
printed in IRS Letter Rulings No. 141, November 14, 1979 (CCH).
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equal to at least the retail value of those goods and services, 7 5
or the Exchange extends a line of credit in trade units to new
members that can be used for purchases, but which must be re-
paid from credits earned by future sales.176 After joining the
exchange, members generally acquire additional trade units by
supplying goods andN services to other members or to the Ex-
change itself at "prevailing prices.' 77 Less often, existing
members will acquire additional units by borrowing or by
purchasing them for cash from the Exchange.178
Members may use trade units to acquire goods and serv-
ices as soon as they are credited to their account.179 Members
may also transfer trade units to their employees as salary, or to
shareholders as dividends.180 Exchanges have suggested other
creative uses. For example, one major Exchange advises its
members "to set up a dental program for your employees and
their families and pay for it with trade units" or to "give em-
ployees legal service coverage through prepaid legal service
premiums acquired with trade units."181 No Trade Exchange,
however, guarantees that a member will be able to use all its
units, nor does any agree to purchase unused units for cash.182
The manner in which a trade exchange operates is most
easily understood by following a series of imaginary steps:
1. D, a dentist operating as a sole proprietor, has 330 trade
units, which D has accumulated by performing services for
other exchange members at D's prevailing rate.
2. Corporation C, also an exchange member, is the owner
of a retail men's clothing store.
3. If D wants to acquire a new suit with the trade units, D
will call the Trade Exchange and receive authorization to
purchase clothing at Corporation C's store, or at the store of
another member who sells men's clothing.
175. LTR 8216010, supra note 174; LTR 7945009, supra note 174. In the early
stages of opekation, when an Exchange is anxious to get trade units into circu-
lation, it may issue bonus units to new members. See LTR 7945009, supra.
176. See INTERNAL REvENUE MANUA. (Audit) (Supp. 45G-324, March 17,
1982) [hereinafter IRM 45G-324]. The previous instructions in this area were is-
sued in 1979.
177. See LTR 8216010, supra note 174.
178. Id.
179. See Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100; LTR 8216010, supra note 174; LTR
7945009, supra note 174; IRM 45G-324, supra note 176.
180. See IRM 45G-324, supra note 176.
181. The "Reference Manual" of Barter Systems International (BSI) de-
votes an entire page to the topic of "How to Use Trade Units for Your
Employees."
182. See Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100, 100; LTR 8216010, supra note 174.
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4. D will then go to C's store and acquire, for 300 trade
units, a suit retailing for $300. The Exchange will credit C's ac-
count for 300 trade units and debit D's account for 330 units,
the additional units representing a 10% commission on D's
purchase of the clothing. These 30 units are credited to the Ex-
change's own account.
5. Corporation C may then use all or some of its newly ac-
quired trade units to acquire business goods and services
within the exchange, or to pay a salary to its employees, or a
dividend to its shareholders. The employee or shareholder can
then use the credits to acquire personal goods and services
within the exchange and the cycle continues.
1. The Multiple Roles of a Trade Exchange
a. Broker and Trader of Goods
A Trade Exchange performs the role of broker, trader of
goods, central bank, and government. In its role as broker, the
Exchange "makes available to members information concern-
ing goods and services that other members are offering for ex-
change" and "operates as a vehicle for the exchange of [such]
goods and services."18 3 The Exchange also accounts for mem-
bers' transactions. Each time an exchange of goods takes place
between members, or between a member and the Exchange,
the Exchange debits or credits the appropriate accounts and
periodically provides the members with reports of their bar-
tering activities.184
It is in its capacity as broker that the Exchange receives
commission from members. Any commissions the Exchange
receives in trade units it can use in the same manner as any
member to acquire goods and services within the system.185
The Exchange may use the goods and services it acquires from
its members for its own business purposes or may transfer
them to the individual shareholders, proprietors, or partners of
the Exchange to be used by them for personal purposes. Fre-
quently, however, Exchanges use their trade units to acquire
merchandise which is maintained in the showrooms and ware-
houses of the Exchange for retrade to members.186 This results
in the Exchange's second role as a trader of goods.
183. LTR 8216010, supra note 174.
184. IRM 45G-324, supra note 176.
185. See LTR 8216010, supra note 174; LTR 7945009, supra note 174.
186; See LTR 8216010, supra note 174. Goods and services acquired by the
Exchange from members might also be sold by it for cash.
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To the extent the Exchange sells the acquired merchandise
for the same number of trade units it paid for them, it simply
acts as a clearing house for members' goods. Nevertheless, the
Exchange clearly benefits from this activity. Most importantly,
by acquiring members' goods for trade units, the Exchange
keeps units circulating and thereby maintains an active barter
economy. Also, to the extent the Exchange succeeds in retrad-
ing the acquired goods to members, the Exchange earns addi-
tional commissions.
b. Central Bank and Government
In its more controversial role, a Trade Exchange acts as the
creator of the economy's currency, a role normally reserved to
governments and their central banks.187 It is this quasi-govern-
mental role that, at times, has been abused or simply misused
by certain Exchanges, resulting in the collapse of their barter
system.188 As in all economies, "[1]imitation in the supply of
money is the necessary condition if it is to have value." 89
An unscrupulous Exchange, not having earned sufficient
trade units to meet its own business needs or the personal con-
sumption desires of its owners, might give in to temptation and
simply use its printing press to create additional trade units for
itself. There are, today, no effective controls on an Exchange's
ability to do this,190 although recently an Exchange owner en-
tered a plea of no contest to a charge of grand theft stemming
from this practice.191 Moreover, the International Association
of Trade Exchanges (TATE), the trade association for the in-
dustry, has proposed an internal regulation to deal with this
problem of deficit spending.192 The regulation identifies "un-
secured, uncollateralized deficit spending" as a practice that is
to be eliminated, and "establishes standards and guidelines for
the collateralization of exchange deficits.' 93 Deficit spending
187. See generally, P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 252-315 (7th ed. 1967) (gen-
eral discussion of the monetary system).
188. See, e.g., Flanagan, Barterers Beware, FORBES, August 17, 1981, at 102,
103.
189. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 187, at 264.
190. See Flanagan, supra note 188. Some state authorities question the un-
regulated use of barter club scrip, saying that such scrip may constitute the is-
suance of a security. They have, consequently, insisted that clubs modify their
operation to comply with securities law. Leff, supra note 167, at 1, col 4.
191. State v. Kincaid, No. 80CR-10-3270 (C.P. Franklin Cty., Ohio 1981).
192. A copy of this regulation can be obtained from the International Asso-
ciation of Trade Exchanges, 5001 Seminary Road, Suite 310, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia 22311.
193. See supra note 192.
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is defined as "the spending of trade credits in excess of earn-
ings by an exchange, exchange owner, stockholder, or other
principal, where the amount spent is not secured by acceptable
collateral."194
Exchanges may also damage the system by over issuing
trade units, even where their stated and actual purpose is to
benefit the system as a whole. For example, Exchanges may is-
sue new units to entice businesses to join the exchange;195 they
may issue new units as loans to new or existing members;196 or
they may issue new units to acquire merchandise for retrade
through their own showrooms. 97 Unless these actions, which
increase the money (trade units) supply, are followed by a pro-
portionate increase in production, or activity within the ex-
change, there presumably will be a devaluation of the
currency. 198
2. The Proliferation of Trade Exchanges
Nationally, trade exchanges have flourished since the
1960's. Today there are nearly 300 such exchanges, represent-
ing some 60,000 members and exchanging $300 million annually
in all sorts of products and services.1 99 The list of goods and
services available from the country's leading trade exchange in-
cludes accounting, advertising, airline tickets, architects, art
work, attorneys, audiovisual equipment, automobile rental and
repair, books, children's apparel, commercial real estate serv-
ices, dentistry, financial consulting, health clubs, holistic
medicine, hotel rooms, marketing consultants, office furniture,
194. See supra note 192. In 1981 an Ohio man pleaded no contest in Frank-
lin County (Ohio) Common Pleas Court to a charge of grand theft, stemming
from his creation of trade credits for his own benefit "beyond the express or
implied consent of the Exchange Membership." Plaintiff's Hearing Brief at 2,
State v. Kincaid, No. 80CR-10-3270 (C.P. Franklin Cty., Ohio 1981). Despite his
plea of no contest, Kincaid insisted he had not committed a crime by his ac-
tions since "'deficit spending' is all that he was doing and that somehow 'deficit
spending' must be lawful because his instruction booklet [said] that 'pump
priming' is to be expected at first." Id.
195. LTR 7945009, supra note 174.
196. See IRM 45G-324, supra note 176.
197. See LTR 8216010, supra note 174.
198. See generally P. SAmuELSON, supra note 187, at 270-73 (discussion of
the quantity theory of money).
199. 128 CONG. REc. S3060 (daily ed. March 30, 1982) (remarks of Sen.
Baucus) (hereinafter cited as Remarks of Sen. Baucus). It has been reported
"that the commercial barter industry has been growing at the rate of about 20
percent a year for the past 6 or 7 years, and will probably sustain a 15 percent
growth in the immediate future." Id. If this data is correct, commercial barter
"will double in size every 4 to 5 years," a development of potential significance
to the economy of the United States. Id.
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picture framing, planning and design, plants and trees, plumb-
ig, printing, public relations, restaurants, sales promotion, tax
consulting, vitamins, water filtration systems and yacht
rentals.200
The major trade exchanges are national franchise opera-
tions. For example, Barter Systems International (BSI), the
largest of the exchanges, now claims to have 27,000 membeis in
66 cities throughout the United States201 and is planning to ex-
pand to Australia, England, Canada, the Phillipines, and vari-
ous Latin American countries. 202 BSI boasts a computer
network that allows their franchises all over the country to
trade among themselves. 203 This means that, for trade units,
members can acquire goods not otherwise available in their
city and dispose of their goods for barter in a national market.
Assuming all tax liability stemming from the bartering will
be reported properly,204 the major advantage to a taxpayer in
joining a barter exchange is simply that of obtaining new busi-
ness. The electrician joins hoping that club members will call
him or her rather than the hundreds of other electricians in the
yellow pages. Restaurants join for the same reason. So do re-
tailers or manufacturers with excess inventory or spare capac-
ity. On the other hand, doctors or lawyers with all the cash
business they can handle would gain little from joining.
3. The Prevailing Price Requirement
Trade Exchanges generally require members to provide
their goods and services to other members at "prevailing
200. See TRANSACTIONS, Oct. 1, 1981, at 3-4 (a monthly periodical of BSI
franchises in New York and southern California).
201. Id. at 1. All franchise offices of Barter Systems, Inc. changed their
name to Barter Systems International as of April 1, 1982.
202. See BARTER SYSTEMs IT'L., THE BARTER SYSTEM, April, 1982, at 1 (a
newsletter from Kensington, Maryland).
203. See TRANSACTIONS, supra note 200, at 1.
204. Newly enacted legislation requiring information reporting by Barter
Exchanges will help insure such compliance. See infra notes 217-20 and accom-
panying text. Many club presidents claim that they now inform their members
of their obligation to report trades as income, but they cannot help it if the
members do not in fact comply. Leff, supra note 167, at 19. Other clubs, how-
ever, ard reported routinely to destroy all records pertaining to individual
transactions every year. Id. On the other hand, at least one exchange, the
Butcher Trade Exchange, includes the following provision in its contract with
members:
The [member] represents and warrants to the Exchange that it
will fully report and pay all taxes, including, but not limited to, sales
taxes, income taxes, or other taxes arising from any transaction in
which the Exchange is involved, to the appropriate federal, state or
county taxing authority.
[Vol. 67:441
BARTER TRANSACTIONS
prices" or 'prevailing retail prices." 205 On its face this seems to
compel members to conduct all trades at the same price they
would charge cash customers. In practice, however, the Trade
Exchanges and their members understand this prevailing price
requirement somewhat differently. It seems to mean that a
member cannot charge more than the undiscounted retail price
or its membership will be cancelled.206 On the other hand,
members are not required nor even expected to discount goods
sold in barter, even though such discounts are generally avail-
able to all or some cash customers.207 This means that the true
value of the goods and services acquired by an exchange mem-
ber (true value being the amount of cash it would have taken
the member to acquire the same item from the same merchant)
will often be less than the trade unit price charged that ex-
change member.208
B. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO TRADE EXCHANGES
Concern about the size of the "underground economy" in
general209 and the growth of trade exchanges in particular led
the Service in 1979 to examine the extent of income tax evasion
through organized bartering.210 The Service authorized its
agents to obtain membership lists from Trade Exchanges by
using the special "John Doe summons" procedure of section
7609(f) if necessary.211 Section 7609(f) authorizes the Service
205. For example, the agreement between Exchange Enterprises, Inc. and
its members states, 'Members agree to sell goods and or services for trade
units, at their PREVAILING RETAIL PRICES, to other members. The Ex-
change has the right at any time to check on over-pricing. Violation may sub-
ject member to immediate cancellation of membership." The contract of BSI is
similar but uses the term "prevailing prices" rather than "prevailing retail
prices." Butcher Trade Exchange, Inc. (Fort Washington, Pa.), on the other
hand, has no such language in its contract.
206. See, e.g., supra note 205.
207. For example, BSI specifically states, under its general trading policies
and procedures, "Discounting should not be anticipated nor requested." It
adds, "Normal markups should be realized in each trade transaction." BARTER
SYSTEMS, INC., REFERENCE MANUAL, at 2.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 246-62. For example, member A
may go to the retail store of Member B to buy a tape recorder which lists for
$600 but which B is currently selling for $480. A will probably have to use 600
trade units to acquire this tape recorder, even though A could buy it for $480 in
cash.
209. See, e.g., Underground Economy "Growing Very Nicely," Baltimore
Morning Sun, Apr. 17, 1981, at All; Lohr, How Tax Evasion Has Grown, N.Y.
Times, March 15, 1981, § 3, at 1, coL 2; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ESTIMATES
OF INCOME UNREPORTED ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx RETURNS, PUB. No. 1104
(September, 1979).
210. See IRM 45-324, supra note 176, § 1.02.
211. Id., § 8.02(1). Since the names of the members whose tax liabilities are
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to issue a summons upon a third party without identifying the
taxpayer with respect to which the summons relates if the
summons concerns the investigation of a particular person or
identifiable group of persons, the Secretary has a reasonable
belief that such person or group of persons may have violated
the tax laws, and the information sought is not readily available
elsewhere. 212
The Service has generally been successful in enforcing its
John Doe summonses against the Trade Exchanges.213 The
principal issue in the litigated cases has been whether the
Service had a reasonable basis to believe that exchange mem-
bers had not complied with the tax laws. The courts concluded
that such a reasonable basis existed. They accepted the Serv-
ice's argument that barter transactions are inherently error
prone, based on prior audits of members of other exchanges,
and did not require the Service to demonstrate an actual viola-
tion by any member of the summoned exchange. 214
being examined are unknown, the normal third party summons procedure,
detailed infra note 216, is not applicable. Instead, the Service must generally
use the special "John Doe" summons procedure specified in section 7609(f).
212. LR.C. § 7609(f) (Supp. 1982).
213. See, e.g., In re The Tax Liabilities of John Does, Members of the Co-
lumbus Trade Exchange in the Years 1977 and 1978, 671 F.2d 977, 980 (6th Cir.
1982); United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exchange, Inc., 644 F.2d 302, 306 (3d
Cir. 1981). See infra note 214.
214. The leading case in this area is United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Ex-
change, Inc., 664 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit was satisfied that the
Service had met the "reasonable basis" requirement through testimony of an
IRS agent to the effect that barter transactions are inherently susceptible of tax
error, because no cash is involved and because the only records of a member's
transactions are kept by the Exchange and are not available to the members.
Id. at 306.
The Service was again successful in In re The Tax Liabilities of John Does,
Members of the Columbus Trade Exchange in the Years 1977 and 1978, 671 F.2d
977 (6th Cir. 1982), where the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's finding
of lack of a reasonable basis to suspect noncompliance with the tax laws. The
Service had argued that its experience with errors in the tax returns of mem-
bers of other barter exchanges was enough to satisfy the reasonable basis re-
quirement, but the district court disagreed, ruling that an inference that
members of this exchange (the Columbus Trade Exchange) had committed er-
rors because members of other exchanges had, was too tenuous to satisfy the
requirement. In re The Tax Liabilities of John Does, Members of the Colum-
bus Trade Exchange in the years 1977 and 1978, No. C-2-80-410 (S.D. Ohio, June
17, 1980). The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that it was not necessary for the
Service to produce evidence of an actual violation. It was enough that the facts
surrounding a transaction suggested the probable occurrence of reporting er-
rors. 671 F.2d at 980.
The Service has, however, lost a case involving a John Doe summons is-
sued to a Barter Exchange for failure to employ the proper procedural steps
involving a preissuance hearing as required by § 7609(f). In United States v.
Barter Systems, Inc., 49 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) % 82-399 (D. Neb. 1981), the Service
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In examining the returns of uncooperative members, the
Service frequently has had to summon the records of the Ex-
changes themselves under section 7602(2) to obtain informa-
tion regarding the volume of a particular member's barter
activity. Before enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),215 the Code did not classify
Trade Exchanges as third party recordkeepers for purposes of
section 7609. As a result, exchange members had no right to
notice of a summons to an Exchange concerning their records
under section 7609(a) and no right to stay compliance with
such summonses under section 7609(b).216
In enacting TEFRA, Congress gave Barter Exchanges 217
issued a § 7602 summons to a Barter Exchange requesting, among other things,
a list of the members. The special requirements of § 7609 were not followed,
because the Service maintained that it was only interested in the tax liability of
the Barter Exchange, which, because it was identified, did not call for the spe-
cial procedures associated with a John Doe summons. The court disagreed,
finding that since one of the announced purposes of the Service was to check
on compliance with the tax laws by members of barter exchanges, it followed
that the summons before it was at least partially aimed at unknown persons,
which required following the § 7609(f) procedures. The court found in favor of
the Service, however, in United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S. Tax. Cas.
9830; 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 81-308 (D. Md. 1980), where the court enforced a
§ 7602 summons issued to a barter exchange requesting a list of members, de-
spite the Service's failure to follow the § 7609(f) procedures. The Constanti-
hides court expressly found that the summons before it was issued solely to
determine the tax liability of the Exchange itself and was not in any way being
used to check on the members. Id. at 85,735, 47 A.F.T.IR2d (P-H) at 81-324.
The Service has lost John Doe summons cases in contexts other than bar-
ter exchanges for failure to demonstrate a reasonable basis. See, e.g., In re Oil
and Gas Producers Having Processing Agreements with Kerr-McGee Corp., 500
F. Supp. 440, 443 (W.D. Okla. 1980); United States v. Brigham Young University,
485 F. Supp. 534, 538 (D. Utah 1980), rev'd, 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982). It has
not lost any cases for that reason, however, in the barter exchange area. The
court in United States v. Barter Systems, Inc., 49 A.F.T.I.2d (P-H) 82-399, at
82-625 did not even suggest the possibility that the Service would not have been
successful if it had employed the special § 7609(f) procedures. There seems no
reason to believe, therefore, that the Service could not eventually obtain the
names of every member of an organized barter exchange in the country.
215. See supra note 17.
216. LR.C. § 7609 (1976) (originally enacted as the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L No. 94-455, § 1205(a), 90 Stat. 1520, amended by TEFRA, supra note 17,§§ 331, 332), establishes special procedures for certain third-party summonses.
Generally, under the law as amended, if a taxpayer's records are summoned
from a third party recordkeeper, the taxpayer is entitled to receive notice of the
summons. If the taxpayer desires to prevent compliance with the summons by
the recordkeeper, the taxpayer must begin a civil action in court to quash the
summons not later than the 20th day after notice of the summons was given. A
prerequisite to the taxpayer's right to intervene and stay compliance with the
summons is that the summonsee be one of the specifically listed third party
recordkeepers in § 7609 (a) (3). Before the enactment of TEFRA, the list did not
include barter exchanges.
217. A "barter exchange" is defined under the new Act as "any organization
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status as third party recordkeepers under section 7609, so that
members are now entitled to notice of any summons directed
to an exchange for their records and to intervene in order to
prevent an exchange from complying with any such sum-
mons.2 18 The Trade Exchanges' new status was not without its
price, however. Congress also included Exchanges in the defi-
nition of broker under section 6045,219 thus requiring Ex-
changes, like other brokers, to ifie annual informational returns
with the Service.2 20 These returns will have to detail the barter
activities of the members of the exchange. The increased at-
tention given Trade Exchanges by both Congress and the Serv-
ice demonstrates that the activities of exchange members will
not go unscrutinized for tax compliance. Thus, it is essential
that the Service and exchange members understand the tax
consequences of bartering through Trade Exchanges.
C. THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF BARTERING THROUGH TRADE
EXCHANGES
Bartering through trade exchanges raises a number of in-
teresting tax issues:
(i) Does a member of a trade exchange, or the Ex-
change itself, recognize income when trade units are credited
to its account, or only when it expends the units to obtain
goods and services?
(ii) If income is recognized to a member or the Ex-
change upon the crediting of trade units to its account, how is
the value of those trade units to be determined for tax
purposes?
(iii) Assuming a member or the Exchange includes the
value of a trade unit in income on receipt, what are the tax con-
sequences when it disposes of those units? More specifically,
will any gain or loss be recognized when the trade unit is used
of members providing property or services who jointly contract to trade or bar-
ter such property or services." TEFRA, supra note 17, § 311 (amending LR.C.
§ 6045 (1980)).
218. TEFRA amends § 7609(a) (3) (defining third party recordkeeper) to in-
clude "any barter exchange (as defined in section 6045(c) (3))." TEFRA, supra
note 17, § 311.
219. TEFRA, supra note 17, § 311 (amending I.R.C. § 6045 (1980)).
220. Every person doing business as a broker must "make a return, in ac-
cordance with such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, showing the
name and address of each customer, with such details regarding gross proceeds
and such other information as the Secretary may by forms or regulations, re-
quire with respect to such business." I.R.C. § 6045(1980), amended by TEFRA,
supra note 17, § 311.
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to acquire goods and services? And, if deductible items are ac-
quired with trade units, what amount will be deductible?
1. Taxation of Exchange Members
a. Revenue Ruling 80-52
In Revenue Ruling 80-52,221 the IRS dealt with the tax con-
sequences of two exchange members, A and B, and an em-
ployee of the Exchange, C. All three taxpayers used the cash
receipts and disbursements method of accounting, and they
were free to use trade units to acquire goods and services
within the system as soon as the units were credited to their
accounts.
In situation 1 of the ruling, "A bartered to B for 200 credit
units services that A would normally perform for $200."222 In
that same year, "B bartered to A for 200 credit units services
that B would normally perform for $200."223 In situation 2, C,
an employee of the Trade Exchange, received 10,000 trade units
as compensation for services performed. The Service ruled
that members A and B had to include $200 in gross income and
that employee C had to include $10,000 in gross income for the
taxable year in which the units were credited to their
accounts.224
In reaching its conclusion that these three taxpayers real-
ized income at the time the trade units were credited to their
accounts, the Service appeared to reason that the taxpayers
were in "actual" receipt of the trade units, which themselves
constituted valuable property rights taxable under section 61,
rather than that they were in constructive receipt of the goods
and services they could immediately obtain by using the trade
units:
In this case A, B, and C received income in the form of a valuable
right represented by credit units that can be used immediately to
purchase goods or services offered by other members of the barter
club. There are no restrictions on their use of credit units because A,
B, and C are free to use the credit units to purchase goods or services
when the credit units are credited to their accounts. 225
221. 1980-1 C.B. 100.
222. Id. at 100.
223. Id. The coincidence of A and B exchanging equal value services dur-
ing the year was obviously introduced by the Service to make the ruling sim-
ple. In the more usual situation, A would do work for B and use the trade units
earned to acquire goods or services from a third party.
224. Id. at 101.
225. Id. at 101. The Service stated that C's income constituted wages sub-
ject to withholding. Id In LTR 7945009, supra note 174, the Service similarly
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With respect to the tax consequences when a member uses
a trade unit to acquire goods and services, the ruling implicitly
concluded that a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction of $1.00 per
trade unit used to pay for currently deductible goods and serv-
ices. 226 If a member expends the trade units on capital items, it
must capitalize the expenditure of $1.00 per trade unit ex-
pended, and, if the member uses them to acquire personal
goods and services, it receives no tax benefit.227 The commis-
sions paid in trade units by members similarly may be ex-
pensed or capitalized if the cost of the goods or services
acquired with respect to which the commissions were paid may
be expensed or capitalized.228
Since the Service assumed in Revenue Ruling 80-52 that a
trade unit has a value of $1.00 when received229 and will be
used to acquire property or services worth $1.00,230 it did not
discuss the possibility of a taxpayer realizing gain or loss on
the disposition of a trade unit or taking a deduction in an
amount other than one dollar per unit.231
b. Is Income Realized on the Receipt of a Trade Unit?
The trade exchange industry rejects the Service's conten-
tion that income is realized the moment a taxpayer has a trade
unit credited to its account. They argue that income is not real-
ized until the taxpayer uses its units to acquire goods and serv-
concluded that a sole proprietor, who was the owner of a Trade Exchange, had
income when the commissions earned in trade units were credited to his ac-
count. In so ruling, the Service spoke in terms of constructive receipt, but
seemed to be saying only that the owner of the Exchange was in constructive
receipt of the trade units "in the year they are added to his account in the nor-
mal course of events," not that he was in constructive receipt of the underlying
property which he could purchase with the units. Id.
226. 1980-1 C.B. at 101.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. The ruling specifically states that "[e]xchanges are made on the basis
that one credit unit equals one dollar of value." Id. at 100. Similarly, in IRM
45G-324, supra note 176, at 8279-3, it is stated that "[g]enerally, one credit re-
ceived will equal one dollar received." On the other hand, in LTR 8216010,
supra note 174, the Service notes, without comment, that in the exchange
under discussion, trade units have been sold at "x" per trade unit, and that the
Exchange included trade credits in its income (in one year) at that price. It
seems clear that "x" in the ruling is less than $1.00. Similarly, in LTR 7945009,
supra note 174, no conclusion as to valuation is stated. Rather, it is stated that
"the fair market value" of the credits were includible in the taxpayer's income
in the year credited to the taxpayer's account.
230. 1980-1 C.B. at 100.
231. For such a discussion, see infra notes 266-96 and accompanying text.
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ices.232 The Service's position should be sustained, however,
for a number of reasons. First, barterers, whether cash or ac-
crual basis taxpayers, are arguably in receipt of the goods or
services ultimately acquired through the use of the trade units
at the time they receive the trade units under the doctrine of
constructive receipt,233 since they can convert the trade units
into goods or services at any time. That members must first
contact the Exchange for authorization, and then may not im-
mediately be able to obtain the exact goods or services ordered,
does not seem to constitute such a "substantial limitation or re-
striction"234 on a member's right to obtain the goods and serv-
ices as to render these transactions outside the scope of the
constructive receipt doctrine.235
Second, the Service's position is supportable on the alter-
232. See International Association of Trade Exchanges, Press Release, Sept.
16, 1981 (hereinafter cited as IATE). This position is claimed by the taxpayer in
LTR 8216010, supra note 174. See infra text accompanying note 318.
233. A cash basis taxpayer, not otherwise in actual receipt of property, may
be required to report income under Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 T.D. 7663, 1980-1 C.B.
101, dealing with the concept of constructive receipt. See generally 4 B. Brrr-
KER, supra note 20, 105.2.3 (1981) (constructive receipt); Metzer, Constructive
Receipt Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income, 29 TAx. L. REV. 525
(1974); Watts, Some Problems of Constructive Receipt of Income, 27 TAX LAw. 23
(1973). Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 provides in part-
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available
so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have
drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw
had been given. However, income is not constructively received if the
taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or
restrictions. Thus, if a corporation credits its employees with bonus
stock, but the stock is not available to such employees until some fu-
ture date, the mere crediting on the books of the corporation does not
constitute receipt.
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2, T.D. 7663, 1980-1 C.B. 101.
An accrual basis taxpayer reports income when "all events have occurred
which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) T.D. 6500, 25 Fed.
Reg. 11709. This means that an accrual basis taxpayer will often be required to
report income before a cash basis taxpayer. If, however, upon performing serv-
ices or selling goods, the accrual basis taxpayer is immediately paid in cash,
property, or services, the accrual basis taxpayer, like the cash basis taxpayer,
will simply value the receipt (if non-cash) and report it immediately as income.
See 4 B. BrrrKER, supra note 20, 105.3.4. Moreover, like a cash basis taxpayer,
an accrual basis taxpayer can be in constructive receipt of property. Id. at
105.2.3 n.13.
234. See Treas. Reg. § 1A51-2; supra note 233.
235. Any delay in converting the unit into property is wholly voluntary with
the taxpayer, and the Exchange seems to be no more than a passive custodian
of the units until the taxpayer chooses to use them. See generally 1 B. Brrr=R,
supra note 20, 1 10.2.3 (payments to employees).
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native theory, apparently adopted by the Service, that the trade
units are themselves valuable property rights of a nature tradi-
tionally considered to constitute income taxable under section
61(a).2 3 6 This seems the more correct theory. Cash basis tax-
payers are required to include in income not only cash income
received during the taxable year but also the value of any non-
cash consideration received.23 7 A cash basis taxpayer does not
receive reportable income upon the receipt of noncash consid-
eration only when the consideration takes the form of the non-
assignable promise of the one for whom the taxpayer has
performed services or to whom the taxpayer has sold goods. 23 8
Trade units, however, represent more than the mere promise of
the individual member for whom the taxpayer performed serv-
ices or to whom he or she sold goods. Rather, each trade unit
represents the promise of the entire exchange membership, as
a group, to allow the recipient of the unit to use it to acquire
the goods and services offered by the membership.239 More-
over, at least in the case of the established exchanges, these
promises represented by trade units, are readily assignable or
transferable to other members of the trade exchange. 240 As the
medium of exchange of the trade exchange, trade units resem-
ble foreign currency, which the tax law has long required U.S.
citizens to include in their gross income upon receipt.241
236. "Gross income includes income realized in any form, whether in
money, property, or services. Income may be realized, therefore, in the form of
services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property, as well as in cash."
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1960). This seems to be the theory adopted by the Serv-
ice in Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100. See supra notes 221-31 and accompanying
text.
237. The cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting requires
"all items which constitute gross income (whether in the form of cash, property
or services)... to be included [in income] for the taxable year in which actu-
ally or constructively received. . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1) (i) (1960).
238. See 4 B. BrrTKE, supra note 20, 105.2.2; Watts, supra note 233, at 28-
29.
239. See supra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
240. While the mere promise of an income obligor does not generally repre-
sent income to a cash basis recipient, such a promise may be a cash equiva-
lence, requiring inclusion by a cash basis taxpayer, where the form and
substance of the contract make it readily assignable, or transferable in com-
merce. Cowden v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 853 (1959), rev'd, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.
1961), on remand, 20 TAX CT. MuM. DEC. (CCH) 1134 (1961). See 4 B. Brrr=xR,
supra note 20, § 105.2.2; Watts, supra note 233, at 29.
241. Trade units seem most closely analogous to a special type of so-called
"blocked" foreign currency, which, due to exchange restrictions, cannot be
readily converted into U.S. dollars, but which can be used freely within the for-
eign country itself to acquire goods and services. The income tax conse-
quences of foreign exchange transactions and exchange rate fluctuations are
discussed in abundant detail in D. RAVENSCRoFT, TAXATION AND FOREIGN Cur-
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An additional argument the barter industry advances for
not taxing trade units on receipt is that, although such units
are property, they have no ascertainable fair market value.
This "open transaction" approach 242 is appropriate, however,
only where neither side of an exchange has an ascertainable
fair market value.24 3 Where the value of the property received
cannot be determined with reasonable accuracy, but the value
of the property given up can be, one can merely presume the
value of the property received to be equal to the value of the
property given up.24 4 Thus, even if trade units have no inde-
pendently ascertainable fair market value, they still have a
value for tax purposes equal to the fair market value of the
goods and services exchanged for the units.245
RENCY (Harvard Law School International Tax Program, 1973). On the subject
of blocked currency, see generally id., at 123-65, 479-539. Generally, unrestricted
foreign currency received by U.S. citizens as payment for goods and services is
treated as property, and is reportable as income on receipt at its value in U.S.
dollars. Rev. RuL 74-222, 1974-1 C.B. 21. See generally D. RAvENSCROFr, supra.
In the 1930's and 40's, taxpayers argued that if the received currency was not
readily convertible into U.S. dollars nor usable to pay U.S. taxes, it should not
be currently taxable, even though usable within the foreign country. In a
number of cases, however, courts have rejected this argument, finding the tax-
payer could get full "economic satisfaction" by spending the blocked currency
in the foreign country. See, e.g., Edmond Weil, Inc. v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d
950 (2d Cir. 1945); Eder v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943); Cooper v.
Commissioner, 15 T.C. 757 (1950), acq., 1951-1 C.B. 2; Freudmann v. Commis-
sioner, 10 T.C. 775 (1948), acq., 1948-2 C B. 2; Marty, Jr. v. Commissioner, 31 TAx.
CT. MEm. DEc. (CCH) 26 (1972).
242. See, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). Enactment of the Install-
ment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980), will nar-
row the use of the "open transaction" approach of Burnet v. Logan. The open
transaction approach will be "limited to those rare and extraordinary cases...
where the fair market value of a purchaser's obligation cannot reasonably be
ascertained." S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 198 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4696, 4719. See Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15 (con-
tracts and claims to receive indefinite amounts must be valued for tax
purposes).
243. See 2 B. BrrrERn, supra note 20, 43.2. The approach of United States
v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1965), "suggests that the 'open transaction' theory of Bur-
net v. Logan applies only if neither the property given up nor the property re-
ceived can be valued with reasonable accuracy." 2 B. BrrrxR, supra, 43.2
(emphasis in original).
244. See supra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
245. It is only the Trade Exchange itself which might argue for an open
transaction approach, since it is receiving trade units for services which are so
specialized as not to have any independently ascertainable fair market value.
But, in the end, the Exchange also must lose this argument, since the trade
units in fact do have an ascertainable value. See infra notes 246-62 and accom-
panying text. In LTR 8216010, supra note 174, a Trade Exchange failed to con-
vince the Service that the value of the trade units it received could not be
ascertained with reasonable accuracy.
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c. Valuation of Trade Units
Having determined that trade units constitute reportable
income upon receipt, the next major issue is their value-that
is, how much income does a taxpayer realize upon receiving a
trade unit? The.Service, as previously noted, takes the position
that a trade unit is generally worth one dollar, because, under
the relevant contract, a trade unit can buy one dollar's worth of
goods and services at '"prevailing prices." 24 6 But, as earlier dis-
cussed, the term "prevailing price" often means a price above
that at which goods and services are normally sold for cash.24 7
Therefore, a trade unit's real value is clearly less than one
dollar.
The Trade Exchanges advance the position that, if trade
units are to be taxed upon receipt, they should be valued by
reference to the value of what the member gave up to obtain
them.2 48 Thus, the Trade Exchanges support a presumed-
equivalence-in-value approach.249 In a fact sheet on barter tax
issues, 25 0 the LATE states that:
[Revenue Ruling 80-52] did not satisfactorily address the question of
how trade units are to be valued. It implies that one trade unit is to be
valued at one dollar, which is demonstrably incorrect as a general ex-
pression of the fair market value of a trade unit, though it may be accu-
rate in particular transactions .... IATE believes that, if trade units
are to be declared as income upon receipt, as IRS now requires, their
fair market value is properly determined by the fair market value
(wholesale, average, or incremental cost) of the goods or services given
in exchange for the trade credits. 2 51
Under a presumed-equivalence-in-value approach,252 if
member A trades goods with a value of $75 for 100 trade units,
A will have $75 of income to report. If member B, on the other
hand, trades goods with a value of $90 for 100 units, B will rec-
ognize $90 of income. Thus, each member might report a differ-
ent amount of gross income on the receipt of the same number
of trade units.
As a matter of substantive law, the use of a presumed-
equivalence-in-value technique is clearly inapposite, at least for
the large national exchanges. To use the presumed-equiva-
lence-in-value approach requires a determination that the prop-
246. Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100, 100. See supra notes 229-31 and accom-
panying text.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 205-08.
248. See IATE, supra note 232.
249. See generally supra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
250. IATE, supra note 232.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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erty received has no readily ascertainable fair market value.253
This simply is not the case with respect to trade units used by
large numbers of taxpayers to make thousands of purchases of
goods and services each year within a trade exchange. Each
one of these purchases represents a disposition in the market-
place of a trade unit, and from these thousands of transactions,
a value for a trade unit is surely ascertainable. In essence,
each member, upon receipt of a trade unit, is getting an item of
property entitling it to acquire the same goods and services as
every other member. Therefore, the economic value of a trade
unit to each member is the same regardless of what the mem-
ber gave up to acquire it.
In less established exchanges, however, where the number
of members is small and the purchasing power of a trade unit
is very volatile, the use of the value of the goods and services
given up may be an appropriate valuation technique. But even
in such cases the IATE fact sheet is misleading or simply
wrong. The IATE's statement does not make it clear that it is
the "value," not the "cost," of the goods and services given up
that determines the barterer's income. The value of the goods
and services given up is that price at which the barterer would
have sold such goods or services to the purchaser in a cash
sale.2 Since most exchange members are retailers, the retail
value of the goods given up generally will be the appropriate
valuation for reporting income. The IATE's suggestionSS that
wholesale or average value might be used is misleading. Its im-
plication that incremental cost is somehow relevant is simply
wrong. In equating the two sides of a barter exchange, the only
relevant factor is the value, not the cost, incremental or other-
wise, of the goods and services given up.
Thus, having rejected valuing trade units at $1.00 or on the
basis of the value of what was given up, the only remaining so-
lution is to value a unit at less than one dollar and to require all
members to use the same value for income tax reporting pur-
poses. The value so determined should reflect the "purchasing
power ratio" between trade units and dollars. That is, a trade
unit's value is the average value, in dollars, of goods and serv-
ices acquired within the exchange during the year for a trade
unit.25 6
253. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
255. See supra text accompanying note 251.
256. See infra note 259.
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The Trade Exchanges themselves should be responsible for
determining this value.257 Having done so, they would then,
under the 1982 legislation, be required to submit information
returns to their members and to the IRS showing the amount
of barter income received by members during the year.2 58 Be-
cause individual members would not have the facts available to
challenge successfully the valuation determined by the Ex-
change, the Service's enforcement efforts could be limited to
the Trade Exchange itself.
If a Trade Exchange informally makes cash sales of its
trade units to members for less than their value as determined
above, it is possible to argue that the cash price for which they
can be purchased represents their value to all recipients. But
while the price at which property would sell in a cash transac-
tion generally is a proper measurement of the value of in-kind
income, this rule is not appropriate with respect to trade units.
The value of a trade unit should be determined by what it can
buy within the exchange, and not the cash price for which it
can be purchased or sold. By analogy, if a U.S. taxpayer re-
ceives foreign currency, usable within the foreign country to ac-
quire goods and services, but not readily convertible into U.S.
dollars, an informal market often develops, in which the tax-
payer can sell the foreign currency to U.S. citizens wishing to
invest or spend the currency in the foreign country.259 In such
circumstances, it would be clearly improper to value the cur-
257. A Trade Exchange could compute this value by sampling transactions
occurring in the Exchange during the year.
258. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
259. Courts, reasoning that taxable income can be based on the potential of
foreign income to satisfy foreign needs, have included such blocked currency in
the incomie of U.S. citizens. See supra note 241. Having done this, however, the
courts were faced with a valuation issue. For example, in Eder v. Commis-
sioner, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943), after concluding that the blocked currency
was includable in the taxpayer's income, the Second Circuit had to determine
the amount of that income. The court said that, while the Commissioner and
Tax Court's use of a "free peso" exchange rate was clearly inappropriate,
"Iti here is nothing in the record to show how economic satisfaction.., can be
measured in American dollars." Id. at 28. The Second Circuit therefore re-
manded the case to the Tax Court "for further consideration of the appropriate
measure of valuation." Id. In so doing, it suggested the following valuation
technique: "Perhaps [the value of the currency] can be measured on the basis
of the respective price indices in the United States and Colombia, restricting
the commodities included in the indices to those which could readily be
purchased in Colombia in the taxable year." Id. In fact, on remand, the tax-
payer introduced, and the Tax Court accepted as "competent evidence... the
[ratio] between the prices at which the same or similar foods and other com-
modities commonly used by citizens of this country living in Colombia sold in
the United States and Colombia throughout the year 1938." Eder v. Commis-
sioner, 3 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 460, 461 (1944). This use of such "purchas-
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rency at the dollar amount realizable in the United States,
since "the dollar amount realizable in the United States might
be but a fraction of the dollar value of property ... which the
foreign income would buy in the foreign country."260 Since
trade units are the equivalent of a foreign currency, they too
should be valued by their "purchasing power" within the trade
exchange, and not by what they would bring in a cash sale.
If a trade unit's value reflects its purchasing power, the
question arises whether a member realizes income on the bar-
gain purchase of a unit for less than that value. The answer
should be that a member realizes no income on such a
purchase. Exchanges presumably sell units at a bargain for
their own benefit, and not for the benefit of their members.
Therefore, they should properly be treated as arm's length ex-
changes between seller and buyer, resulting in no gain to the
buyer.261 The same should not hold true, however, if an Ex-
change or an exchange member sold units to its own employ-
ees or shareholders for less than their value. In such a case,
the amount by which the value of the trade unit exceeds the
sale price should be dividend or compensation income to the
shareholder or employee.262
d. The Tax Consequences on Disposition of Trade Units
(1) The Direct Barter Approach
Regardless of the value of a trade unit, so long as that value
is considered income at the time the trade unit is credited to a
member's account, there arises the problem of how to treat bar-
terers upon exchanging their trade units for goods and services.
Conceivably, each use of a trade unit could be treated as a di-
rect barter exchange of the trade unit for goods and services.
The barterer would realize gain on the disposition of the units
ing power ratios" is essentially the same as the one suggested herein for
valuing trade units.
260. D. RAVENSCROFr, supra note 241, at 528.
261. See, e.g., Aspegren v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 945, 954 (1969); Pellar v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 299, 309 (1955); Hunley v. Commissioner, 25 TAX CT.
MEM. DEC. (CCH) 355, 357 (1967). The rule in these cases was well stated in
Husted v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 664 (1967): 'ro decide whether the peti-
tioner's acquisition of [property] constituted the receipt of compensation, we
must ascertain whether he acquired such [property] at a bargain and, if so,
whether the purpose of selling it to him at a bargain was to provide him with
compensation." Id. at 673.
262. When a taxpayer is allowed to make a bargain purchase as compensa-
tion, the excess of the value of the property received over its purchase price
represents gross income. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) T.D. 6500, 25 Fed. Reg. 11402.
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to the extent the value of the property or services received ex-
ceeded the basis of the trade units and would realize loss to the
extent that the basis exceeded the value of such property or
services.263 If the taxpayer received deductible property or
services, the deduction would equal the value of the goods and
services received.26 4
To illustrate this approach, assume that member A re-
ceives 1,000 trade units, which A properly includes in income at
their value of $800. A then uses the 1000 units to acquire cur-
rently deductible business services that would have cost A $900
in a cash transaction. Under the direct barter approach, A
would recognize a $100 gain on the disposition of the trade unit
(the $900 value of the services received less A's $800 basis in
the trade units) and would take a $900 business deduction for
the value of the goods received.265
(2) The Medium of Exchange Approach-No Exchange
Fluctuation
While the direct barter approach may be appropriate for
members of certain small unestablished exchanges who prop-
erly value the units on receipt by reference to the value of the
goods and services given up,266 the method seems entirely in-
appropriate for the larger national exchanges. In the latter ex-
changes, the more appropriate approach, both as a matter of
substantive law and from the viewpoint of administrative con-
venience, would be one that treats trade units, when used to
acquire goods and services, as a medium of exchange.2V Under
this approach, the goods and services acquired would be con-
clusively assumed to be equal in value to that of the trade units
used to acquire them. 2 68 Good deals and bad deals would sim-
263. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1976).
264. This is the result under the value received theory of deductions. See
supra text accompanying notes 79-88.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 79-88.
266. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
267. Cf. Dale, Tax Consequences of Currency Fluctuation.: Occasional
Transactions, 32 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1683, 1694-95 (1974) ("foreign currency is
usually a medium of exchange, and its acquisition or disposition as an incident
of a transaction should not independently give rise to recognition of exchange
rate gain or loss").
268. Similarly, for deduction and income purposes, when foreign currency is
used to acquire goods and services, the goods and services are assumed to be
equal in value to the dollar value of the currency used to acquire them. See
RESEARCH INsTrruTE OF ARmICA, FEDERAL TAx COORDINATOR 2D, G-7012
(1982). In Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100, the Service, assuming a constant $I
per unit value for a trade unit, concluded that a taxpayer was entitled to a $1
per trade unit deduction when the taxpayer used trade units to pay for cur-
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ply be ignored. The taxpayer would, in effect, be treated as re-
ceiving the average value of the goods and services a trade unit
could buy, which, absent exchange fluctuation, would be the
same amount the taxpayer took into income on receipt of the
unit.269 Assuming that there is indeed no change in the value
of the trade unit itself from the time of acquisition to the time
of disposition, this approach would result in no gain or loss to
the taxpayer on the disposition of trade units, and produce tax
deductions, if deductible business goods and services were ac-
quired, equal to the value of the units used.
Assume, for example, that during 1982, member A, a sole
proprietor, received 1,000 units valued and included in A's in-
come at $800. Then, in 1983, when the units were still worth
$800, A used them to acquire goods from another member. A
would realize no gain or loss on the latter transaction whether
the goods acquired were worth more or less than $800, because
A would be deemed to have acquired goods equal to the $800 in
trade units used to acquire them. If the goods A acquired were
currently deductible, A should claim an $800 deduction. If, on
the other hand, the goods were personal, A would be entitled to
no deduction, and, if the goods were capital assets, A would
take an $800 basis instead of a current deduction. This is essen-
tially the position of the Service in Revenue Ruling 80-52,270 al-
though there the Service considered a unit for both income and
deduction purposes to be, at all times, worth one dollar.27 '
(3) The Medium of Exchange Approach-Exchange
Fluctuation
The assumption that the value of trade units will not fluctu-
ate from year to year may not be true as applied to any particu-
lar Exchange. The possibility of trade unit fluctuation raises
two tax issues common to exchange rate fluctuation in foreign
currency: whether gain or loss on the disposition of appreci-
ated or depreciated trade units is ordinary or capital and
whether losses incurred by noncorporate members on the dis-
position of depreciated units is allowable at all.2 72
rently deductible goods and services. Id. at 101. See supra text accompanying
note 226.
269. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
270. 1980-1 C.B. 100. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
271. 1980-1 C.B. at 100. See supra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
272. "Foreign currency is usually viewed as 'property' rather than money,
and transactions in foreign currency usually generate gain or loss if the ex-
change rate fluctuates between the inception of a transaction and its comple-
tion." 3 B. BrrricR, supra note 20, 65.7.1, at 65-21. See generally D.
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To illustrate the first issue, suppose that an exchange mem-
ber receives 1,000 trade units in a year in which a trade unit is
worth 80 cents. Suppose further that this member exchanges
these units for business related goods and services in a subse-
quent year when a trade unit is worth 90 cents. The disposition
of these 1,000 units has two tax consequences for the member.
The member has expended units worth $900 for which it is enti-
tled to deduct $900 as a trade or business expense, and the
member has realized a $100 gain on the appreciation of the
units.273
Whether the $100 gain in the example is ordinary or capital
depends on whether the trade units were a capital asset in the
member's hands and were disposed of by sale or exchange.2 74
Since the exchange requirement is clearly met in a barter
transaction, the only issue is whether trade units are capital as-
sets. Although trade units are "property" and do not fall within
any of the express exceptions of section 1221, the courts have
acknowledged that the disposition of certain assets not ex-
pressly excluded from the section 1221 definition of a capital as-
set nevertheless results in ordinary gain or loss. In Corn
Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 2 75 the Supreme Court
recognized that an asset acquired for a purpose integral to the
taxpayer's business, rather than for investment, should pro-
duce ordinary gain or loss upon its disposition. The Court rea-
soned that profits and losses arising from the "everyday
operation of the business" should be classified as ordinary
since Congress did not intend the more favorable capital gains
rates to apply to transactions which are a "normal source of
business income."2 76 The disposition of trade units acquired in
RAVENSCROFT, supra note 241; Adams & Henrey, Tax Consequences of Foreign
Currency Fluctuations, 30 TAX ExEcurIVE 301 (1978) (effect of fluctuations on
various transactions).
273. The same analysis should apply if a member transfers depreciated or
appreciated trade units to an employee as compensation. The member would
take a business deduction equal to the value of the trade units in the year the
compensation was paid and would realize gain or loss equal to the difference
between the unit's value and its basis. If a corporate member transfers appre-
ciated or depreciated units to its shareholder, the corporation would recognize
no gain or loss since a corporation generally recognizes no gain or loss on a dis-
tribution of property with respect to its stock. I.R.C. § 311(a) (1982).
274. Thus, trade units would be treated identically to foreign currency. See
3 B. BrrrxE, supra note 20, 65.7.2.
275. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
276. In Corn Products, the taxpayer, a large manufacturer of corn-related
products, reported gains and losses from the sale of corn futures purchased to
protect it against unexpected price increases for corn in the spot market as cap-
ital gains and losses. The Court held that the gains and losses on the tax-
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the ordinary course of a member's business constitutes a nor-
mal source of business income to the member. Thus, the Corn
Products rule would require any gain or loss realized on such
disposition to be treated as ordinary, rather than capital, gain
or loss. 277
If the disposition of a trade unit results in a loss instead of
a gain, the loss is deductible only to the extent permitted by
section 165, which limits the deductibility of losses sustained
by individuals to those incurred in a trade or business or trans-
action entered into for profit, or attributable to casualty or
theft.278 No one would question that a loss incurred on a dispo-
sition of trade units acquired in the ordinary course of the tax-
payer's business and used to acquire business goods or
services is a deductible loss under section 165(c) (1). The an-
swer, however, is not so clear if the trade units are disposed of
by a noncorporate member to acquire nonbusiness goods or
services.
The limitation on the deductibility of losses in section 165
is similar in structure to that imposed on the deductibility of
expenses by sections 162 and 212.279 Thus, section 165 must be
read in light of section 262 which disallows any deduction for
" personal living or family expenses." 280 Consequently, section
165's function is to identify allowable nonpersonal losses as op-
posed to nonallowable personal losses.28'
In an ideal income tax system, realized losses on the dispo-
sition of property should be disallowed only to the extent the
reduction in value is attributable to the taxpayer's personal
consumption of the asset.282 On the other hand, losses repre-
payer's transactions in corn futures were ordinary, finding that the taxpayer
had a business rather than an investment purpose in purchasing the corn fu-
tures. See also 2 B. Brrrxxn, supra note 20, 1 51.10.3 (discussing the Corn Prod-
ucts doctrine).
277. Cf. America-Southeast Asia Co., 26 T.C. 198 (1956) (gain on disposition
of foreign currency for business inventory held to be ordinary income).
278. I.R.C. § 165(c) (1976).
279. Section 162 allows a deduction for all "ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business." LR.C. § 162(a) (1976). Section 212 allows individuals deductions for
all "ordinary and necessary expenses" paid or incurred "for the production or
collection of income; for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income; or in connection with the determi-
nation, collection, or refund of any tax." IR.C. § 212 (1976).
280. Cf. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) (section 262 limits sec-
tion 212 to expenses that relate to a business).
281. See 1 B. BrrrxER, supra note 20, 25.3.
282. See M. CBmELSTraN, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATioN 15.02, at 258 (3d ed.
1982).
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senting market fluctuation, unrelated to consumption, should
be allowed in full. 28 3 Where an asset is used by a taxpayer for
personal consumption purposes, however, any allocation of the
loss between market fluctuation and personal consumption is
administratively infeasible, and the entire loss is simply disal-
lowed.28 4 But if a taxpayer disposes of an asset which he or
she has never used for personal consumption purposes, any
loss realized must be due to market conditions, and should be
allowed in total, even if the loss does not fit snugly into the lit-
eral language of section 165(c).285 For example, in Marx v.
Commissioner,28 6 the court permitted a taxpayer to deduct a
loss incurred on the sale of a yacht she had inherited from her
husband. The taxpayer never used the yacht herself for per-
sonal purposes, but immediately attempted to sell it for the
best price available. On the eventual sale of the yacht, she sus-
tained a loss. 287 While, literally, the taxpayer did not acquire
the property in a transaction entered into for profit, nor did she
hold it for post-acquisition appreciation, the court allowed her
the loss deduction. It reasoned that the loss was allowable
since she never used the yacht for personal purposes.288 In
other words, the loss could only have resulted from market
fluctuation.
Under this analysis, a loss sustained on the disposition of a
trade unit should never be disallowed, since such a loss will al-
ways be due to market fluctuation, and never to personal con-
sumption. Trade units, like stock and other intangibles, can
never lose value due to personal consumption use. Moreover,
283. See id. Of course, under current law losses from sales of personal
property are routinely disallowed in their entirety under section 165(c) despite
the fact that a portion of the loss was attributable to market fluctuation. Chirel-
stein discusses an example in which a taxpayer buys a car for $5,000 for per-
sonal use and sells it sometime later for $3,800. Id. 6.05, at 121-22. The entire
$1,200 loss is disallowed by section 165(c), regardless of whether some of the
loss is attributable to a market decline in the value of the car, because the law
presumes in the case of personal property that the loss is wholly attributable to
personal use. See id., at 122.
284. See supra note 283.
285. See Weir v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1940). In Weir, the
court allowed a deduction for loss incurred on stock which the taxpayer had
purchased to give himself a voice in the corporation that owned the apartment
building in which taxpayer was a tenant. The deduction was properly allowed
despite the absence of a profit motive because no part of the decline in the
value of a piece of intangible property could be related to personal use.
286. 5 T.C. 173 (1945).
287. The sale price was less than her basis in the yacht, which, under the
predecessor of § 1014, was the estate tax value of the yacht.
288. 5 T.C. at 174. The court concluded that holding the yacht for sale and
its eventiial sale constituted a transaction entered into for profit. Id.
[Vol. 67:441
BARTER TRANSACTIONS
in the case of the disposition of trade units by exchange mem-
bers, there is no difficulty applying the literal words of section
165 to reach this logical result. An exchange member acquires
trade units in the ordinary course of his or her trade or busi-
ness, and disposes of them in an orderly fashion, in exchange
for valuable goods and services. 289 Any loss realized on such a
disposition of trade units seems clearly to be incurred in the
taxpayer's trade or business, and, therefore, deductible under
section 165(c) (1). This is true whether the goods or services
acquired for the units are of a business or personal charac-
ter.290 The important question is why the units were initially
acquired, and for what purpose they were being held. Surely,
the result in Marx would not have changed had the taxpayer
exchanged the inherited yacht for jewelry or other personal
property, rather than for cash.291
289. Similarly, an employee who receives trade units from an employer as
compensation has acquired those units in connection with the employee's trade
or business as an employee.
290. One might analogize trade units acquired in a trade or business for
goods or services normally provided by that trade or business as equivalent to
an accrual method taxpayer's accounts receivable. Any loss realized on the dis-
position of such accounts receivable is clearly deductible, whether the amount
realized on the disposition takes the form of cash or property of a business or
personal character.
291. The Service and a few cases have held, however, that loss resulting
from exchange rate fluctuation is not deductible if realized on the exchange of
devalued foreign currency for personal goods and services. See Puttkamer v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 240 (1976); Boyer v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1168 (1947);
Rev. Rul. 74-276, 1974-1 C.B. 54; Rev. Rul. 74-7, 1974-1 C.B. 198. Cf. Rev. Rul. 71-
134, 1971-1 C.B. 75 (loss incurred in exchanging devalued foreign currency rep-
resenting sale of privately owned automobile for dollars not deductible). These
cases and rulings are all distinguishable from the situation of an employee or
exchange member who uses devalued trade units acquired in his or her trade
or business to acquire personal goods or services. Moreover, it is arguable that
these foreign currency cases are simply wrong.
For example, although both Puttkamer and Revenue Ruling 74-276 contain
language to the effect that the exchange of foreign currency for personal goods
can never result in a loss, both can be explained on other grounds. Properly
read, they stand for the narrower proposition that no loss results to a taxpayer
abroad who is required by the U.S. government to exchange U.S. dollars into
foreign exchange at an official rate less favorable than the free market rate of
exchange. In Puttkamer and Revenue Ruling 74-126, a taxpayer worked abroad
for a U.S. agency, which paid its employees in U.S. dollars. The taxpayer-em-
ployee had to convert those dollars into the local currency at the official ex-
change rate in order to meet his personal needs for food, clothing, etc. The
taxpayer claimed a loss equal to the difference between the free exchange rate
and the official rate for his dollars. Both the Tax Court and the Service held
that no deductible loss occurred, either at the time the taxpayer converted the
U.S. dollars into foreign currency or when he exchanged the foreign currency to
acquire personal goods.
In Revenue Ruling 71-134, 1971-1 C.B. 75, the Service denied a deduction for
a loss incurred on the exchange of devalued foreign currency acquired outside
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Although members usually acquire their trade units as part
of their business operations and may therefore deduct any
losses incurred on their disposition under section 165(c) (1),
trade unit losses may also be deemed incurred in a transaction
entered into for profit, and thus be deductible under section
165(c) (2) as well. This will be the case where a member affirm-
atively decides to hold units for future appreciation, rather
than simply holding them until they can be disposed of in some
orderly fashion. Such a subjective investment purpose will not,
of course, affect the deductibility of any loss, but it could affect
the nature of that loss. That is, a loss incurred on trade units
held for investment purposes, even though initially acquired in
the ordinary course of a trade or business, would not be within
the Corn Products rule.292 In such a case, the loss should be
capital instead of ordinary.
For administrative simplicity, taxpayers should determine
gain or loss on the disposition of a trade unit under a last-in-
first-out (LIFO) method of identifying the units disposed of.293
In other words, the last units acquired would be considered the
first used. Under the LIFO method, gain or loss from fluctua-
tions in the value of trade units would be limited to those years
in which more units were used than acquired. In all other
years, members could simply attach a statement to their tax re-
turns, listing income and deduction in terms of trade units,
with only the bottom line net profit or loss figure-stated in
the taxpayer's trade or business where no investment purpose was apparent.
The taxpayer in the ruling sold a personal automobile immediately before de-
parting a foreign country, receiving foreign currency which he converted into
U.S. dollars. After the sale of the automobile but before the exchange of the
currency, the foreign currency underwent a devaluation, so that the taxpayer
received fewer dollars than would have been payable under the rate of ex-
change prevailing on the date the auto was sold. The Service held that the loss
incurred in exchanging the devalued foreign currency was not deductible under
section 165. A trade exchange member or employee who exchanges devalued
trade units for personal goods or services is easily distinguishable. In the rul-
ing, the transaction in which the taxpayer acquired the foreign currency was a
personal transaction, whereas in the trade exchange setting the initial acquisi-
tion of units occurs in the ordinary course of the member's or employee's trade
or business. Moreover, one could argue that the Service was wrong in denying
the taxpayer the loss deduction in Revenue Ruling 71-134. Since currency can
never be held for personal use, a more reasonable view would treat the acquisi-
tion and exchange of foreign currency as a transaction entered into for profit
under section 165(c) (2). See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
293. The LIFO convention for identifying inventory assumes that the most
recently acquired goods are the ones sold. See generally 4 BrrrKmR, supra note
20, 105.4.3 (FIFO and LIFO).
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terms of trade units-translated into dollars.2 94 Taxpayers
would convert trade units into dollars by using the trade unit
valuation computed by the Trade Exchange for the year in
question. Only if more units were expended than acquired
would the taxpayer be required to include an additional com-
putation for "exchange rate" gain or loss.
For example, assume that member A received 5,000 units
for services performed in 1982, A's first year in the exchange,
and that A used 3,000 of those units to acquire currently de-
ductible goods and services, retaining the other 2,000 units for
future use. If, in 1982, a trade unit was worth eighty cents, A's
bartering income would be $1,600 (net income of 2,000 units x
80o/unit). If A's receipts and expenditures of trade units were
the same in 1983, but a unit had dropped in value to seventy
cents, A's bartering income for 1983 would drop to $1,400. Fi-
nally, if in 1984, when a trade unit was worth sixty cents, A re-
ceived only 2,000 units but expended 6,000 trade units
(including the 4,000 units accumulated from 1982 and 1983) on
currently deductible business items, A's bottom line figure
would be a net bartering loss of 4,000 units, or $2,400 when con-
verted into dollars. Furthermore, in 1984, A would have in-
curred an "exchange rate" loss of $600 for the year, a loss of
$400 on the 2,000 1982 units295 and a loss of $200 on the 2,000 1983
units.296
2. The Taxation of the Barter Exchange
In general, the conclusions reached in the prior section
with respect to the taxation of an exchange member apply
equally to the Exchange itself. That is, the Exchange should
recognize income as soon as trade units are credited to its ac-
count; those trade units should be included at the average
294. This is closely analogous to a method approved by the Internal Reve-
nue Service for taxing foreign branches of U.S. companies. See Rev. Rul. 75-107,
1975-1 C.B. 32; Costello, Tax Consequences of Currency Fluctuations: For U.S.
Businesses Conducting Operations Abroad Through Branches or Subsidiary
Corporations, 32 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1707, 1713-14 (1974).
Under the so-called profit/loss method the U.S. taxable income attribu-
table to a foreign branch is determined by taldng the net profit shown
on the branch's foreign currency profit/loss statement for the year and
translating it into dollars at the exchange rate in effect at the end of the
year. Where remittances have been made to the home office during the
year, they are translated into dolars at the rate in effect on the date re-
mitted, and only the balance of the profit, if any, is translated at the
year-end rate.
Id. at 1713.
295. A loss of 20 cents per unit on 2,000 units.
296. A loss of 10 cents per unit on 2,000 units.
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value of a unit during the taxable year in question; and the dis-
position of units should produce deductions (where appropri-
ate) equal to their value, and should result in gain or loss only
if there has been a fluctuation in the value of the trade unit it-
self. This section considers only those additional tax issues rel-
evant to the Exchange itself.
a. Technical Advice Memorandum 8216010297
The National Office of the Internal Revenue Service has
twice issued technical advice to District Directors on questions
relating to the taxation of Barter Exchanges. One of these
memoranda adds little to the previous discussion. Technical
Advice Memorandum 7945009298 simply concludes that an Ex-
change owner, a sole proprietor, had income on commissions
earned in trade units as soon as those units were "added to
[his] account in the normal course of events." 299
The other, Technical Advice Memorandum 8216010, deals
with the taxation of a Barter Exchange that issues trade units
in excess of those earned by it as commissions. 300 It can be
more easily understood by introducing hypothetical numbers
to illustrate the general facts set forth by the Service in its
memorandum. Assume, for example, that at all relevant times
a trade unit is worth $1.00,301 and in its first year of operation, 30 2
Barter, a trade exchange owner, earns 10,000 units as commis-
sions. In that same year, Barter issues 40,000 trade units, using
its currency creating powers to produce the excess,303 to ac-
quire $40,000 worth of goods and services from its members. 30 4
Of the goods and services acquired, Barter uses half currently
in its business, and places the other half in its showroom for re-
trade to members.305 The facts in Barter's second year of oper-
297. LTR 8216010, supra note 174.
298. LTR 7945009, supra note 174.
299. Id.
300. See supra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
"301. In fact, the memorandum notes that "fi]f trade units are sold for cash,
it has been represented that trade units are exchanged at the rate of x per
trade unit". LTR 8216010, supra note 174.
302. The year .1977 in the Technical Advice Memorandum.
303. See supra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
304. The assumption that a trade unit will always buy $1 worth of goods and
services is erroneous, but is used here for simplicity. See supra notes 205-08
and accompanying text.
305. The Technical Advice Memorandum states that some of the acquired
goods were used in Barter's own business, and the rest for retrade. No break-
down comparable to the one given in the text was, however, provided by the
Service.
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ation are the same as in the first year.
Based on these facts, Barter, in its first year of operation,
reports a $10,000 net loss from its activities. More specifically,
Barter includes $10,000 as commission income on the receipt of
the 10,000 trade units306 and claims a $20,000 deduction for the
20,000 units used to acquire goods and services for its own cur-
rent business benefit.307 Barter, however, does not report any
income as a result of receiving $30,000 worth of goods and serv-
ices in exchange for the newly issued trade units (40,000) in ex-
cess of those earned by Barter as commissions (10,000) and
included in income. 308
According to the Service, Barter made two interrelated er-
rors in its computations. First, it failed to report in income the
$30,000 worth of property received in exchange for the newly
created trade units which had cost Barter nothing.30 9 Second,
having never reported that property in income, it nevertheless
claimed a deduction when it used such zero basis property to
meet its business needs.310 On these facts, the Service's posi-
tion was that Barter should have both reported the income and
claimed the deduction. That is, Barter should have reported
$40,000 of gross income (consisting of the $10,000 worth of trade
units received as commissions plus the $30,000 worth of prop-
erty received for newly issued units) and claimed a $20,000 de-
duction for the goods and services it used for current business
306. Technical Advice Memorandum 8216010 states that, in 1977, Barter's
first year of business, it "reported income on trade units earned as commis-
sions from barter transactions between members." It notes that "Barter as-
signed a value of x per trade unit which is multiplied by the total number of
trade units received as commissions in order to calculate gross income." LTR
8216010, supra note 174.
307. "Under the method used in 1977, Barter would treat as a business ex-
pense those goods and services which it obtained in a barter transaction and
used in its trade or business." Id.
308. Id.
309. The Service noted that "Barter has no cost related to the creation or
issuance of trade units," and trade unit balances of members are "not liabilities
of Barter." Id.
310. Even were Barter correct, initially, in not reporting the receipt of the
property in income, it nevertheless would be required to report the income
when it used zero basis property to acquire a deductible item. See, e.g., United
States v. General Shoe Corp.,. 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843
(1961); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
1943); Solon v. Commissioner, 39 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1245 (1980); Bel-
lows v. Commissioner, 26 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 978 (1967). "Where prop-
erty is used to pay for an item of deductible expense, the transaction gives rise
not only to a deduction but also to the realization of income on such use of the
property." Bellows, 26 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 980. See also supra notes
106-36 and accompanying text.
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purposes. This would give Barter a net income of $20,000,
rather than the net loss of $10,000 Barter claimed. The $20,000
worth of goods retained in the showroom would presumably
take a $20,000 basis3 11 and would have to be inventoried by Bar-
ter.312 Barter would be required to use the accrual method of
accounting with respect to the purchase and sale of such
inventory.313
In its second year,3 14 Barter changed its method of report-
ing income and deductions to what it termed the "barter ac-
counting method." Under this method, it reported income, not
when trade units were credited to its account, but only when it
disposed of the units to acquire goods and services that it used
in its trade or business. 3 15 As in its first year, for tax purposes,
Barter took no account of goods acquired and retained by it for
retrade. Using this "barter accounting method," Barter re-
ported neither overall gain nor loss for the year. It simply in-
cluded in gross income the $20,000 worth of property it received
and used for its business purposes, but claimed the same
amount as a business deduction.
In again determining that Barter had to report $20,000 of
net income ($40,000 gross income minus $20,000 of business de-
ductions), the Service used the same analysis it had used in
the first year, and, in addition, specifically rejected Barter's
contention that it need not report the receipt of trade units as
income. As it had previously done in Revenue Ruling 80-52,316
the Service noted that when Barter received a trade unit as a
commission, Barter received "income in the form of a valuable
311. In Technical Advice Memorandum 8216010, the IRS specifically refused
to take a position on the basis of the goods acquired for the showroom, but no
position other than giving Barter a basig equal to the fair market value of the
goods received and reported in income is possible. LTR 8216010, supra note
174. Whenever a taxpayer receives property which he is required to include in
income, he must be given a cost basis in the property equal to that value. See
supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
312. In its Technical Advice Memorandum, the Service cites section 1.471-1
of the regulations which states, in part, that in order to reflect taxable income
correctly, inventories are necessary in every case in which the production,
purchase, or sale of merchandise is an income producing factor. LTR 8216010,
supra note 174.
313. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (2) (i) (1982) requires that the accrual method
be used with regard to purchases and sales in any case in which it is necessary
to use inventory.
314. The calendar year 1978.
315. See supra text accompanying note 232. It also presumably would have
included in income goods that were used by owners for personal reasons.
316. See supra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
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right, represented by trade units. '317 In response to Barter's
contention that a trade unit had no readily ascertainable value,
the Service stated that "Barter has sufficient data available to
ascertain [a unit's] value for Federal income tax purposes."3 18
There were two possible arguments that Barter could have
made against the result reached by the Service in Technical
Advice Memorandum 8216010. The first, actually advanced by
Barter and rejected by the Service in the memorandum, was
that title to the goods in the showroom remained with the
member and, therefore, could not be income on receipt to Bar-
ter. Barter's position was based on the fact that a member who
transferred goods to Barter could reclaim the goods before they
were bartered to other members. On the other hand, the mem-
orandum notes that as soon as a member's goods are placed in
Barter's showroom the member is credited with trade units and
the member's credit balance is not affected when those goods
are later retraded by Barter or used by Barter for its own busi-
ness purposes. Moreover, if, after having traded goods to Bar-
ter, the member should discontinue its membership, the
member would not be required to reacquire the goods trans-
ferred to Barter (assuming the goods were still available).
These facts make it clear that title, in fact, resides in Barter
and not the member.
A second argument Barter could have made, but did not, is
that, according to the new internal regulation of the IATE on
deficit spending,319 the Service should have treated Barter as
having borrowed the units used to acquire the goods for its
showroom. 320 Since it had an obligation to repay those units
out of future sales and commissions, it realized no income
when it used the borrowed units to acquire goods and services.
The problem with this argument is that, whatever obligation it
may undertake as an IATE member, the Barter Exchange actu-
ally has no indebtedness to a third party. Its indebtedness is
really to itself and, thus, is no indebtedness at all. While it is
true that, under the internal industry regulation,321 failure to
repay the deficit units within a certain period of time can lead
to an Exchange's expulsion from the trade association, it does
317. LTR 8216010, supra note 174.
318. Id. See supra text accompanying note 253.
319. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
320. It would, in effect, be collateralizing the loan with the goods retained in
the showroom or warehouse.
321. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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not follow that the units are borrowed and nonreportable when
first issued.
D. CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
BARTERING THROUGH TRADE EXCHANGES
The tax treatment of Trade Exchanges raises difficult is-
sues from both the viewpoint of administrative enforcement
and that of substantive tax law. The requirement in the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 that Trade Ex-
changes file information returns with the government detailing
the barter transactions of their members will go a long way to-
ward resolving the compliance issue. It also makes it impera-
tive that Exchanges and their members are clearly informed
regarding the tax consequences of their bartering transactions.
This Article suggests that, as a matter of substantive law:
(i) trade units are taxable when credited to a taxpayer's ac-
count; (ii) such units generally should be included by all mem-
bers at a single value equal to the average value of goods and
services acquired by a trade unit during the year;
(iii) expending the units for business goods and services
should produce a tax deduction equal to the value of the units
at the time of disposition; and (iv) in the case of "exchange
rate fluctuation," the disposition of a trade unit generally
should result in ordinary gain or loss equal to the difference be-
tween the basis of the unit exchanged-using a LIFO inventory
method-and its value at the time of transfer.
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